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PART ONE: ALL IN THE FAMILY-WHO IS THE FAMILY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The first part of my title, "All in the Family," refers to the televi-
sion show by that name because it captures the theme I would like to
sound here. Otherwise known as the Archie Bunker show, the central
character in "All in the Family" exhibited gross racial, ethnic, and
sexual prejudices-and yet the show itself celebrated the capacity of
human beings to grow and change within families. What interests me
here in particular is the shift in the constellation of people treated as
family over the years the show was on the air. Initially, Archie and
his wife Edith shared their home with their daughter and her hus-
band-not quite a nuclear family, but a rather traditional extended
family. Over time, however, Archie meets Edith's lesbian cousin. He
also learns to deal with divorce. Ultimately, Edith dies, Archie's
daughter separates from her husband and they both move away, and
Archie becomes the custodian of a niece who is half-Jewish.1 All
inside this "family," then, the variety of shifting relationships mirrored
the variety of potential family memberships in the larger society. Once
a show exhibiting the prejudices of a white ethnic patriarch toward his
diverse society, "All in the Family," over time, brought that diversity
inside the family itself.
Both the growing diversity in groups across this nation who claim
to be families and diversity within the families themselves carry conse-
quences for the three basic issues in family law: 1) who is in "the
family," 2) what benefits accompany family membership, and 3) what
obligations accompany family roles. It may once have seemed that
these questions had obvious and uncontroverted answers. It may once
have seemed that "family" referred to a natural or obvious social entity
created by the biological ties of parent and child and the divine or
contractual ties of marriage.
I am skeptical of all stories of a past golden or untroubled age,
however,2 and I do mean to dispute any claim that "family" as de-
1. See ELLA TAYLOR, PRIME TME FAMIMS 71-76 (1989).
2. See generally OTrO BErEMANN, THE GOOD OLD DAYS: THEY WERE AwFULI
[-Vol. 95:275276
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f'me by law is natural or obvious. Certainly it is a legal rule, not a
natural fact, that creates the presumption that a child born to a woman
who is married is the child of the woman's husband. 3 Rules about
marriage eligibility and practices have also undergone sufficient histori-
cal changes to reveal the political, religious, and social choices em-
bedded in that institution.4
Scholars have also shredded the myth of the homogenous family
with historical and sociological studies revealing enormous variance in
the structures and functions of families. As one author recently con-
cluded, "Families differ by income, by social class, by ethnicity and
religion, by neighborhood and region, by number of members, by rela-
tions with kin, by patterns of authority and affection, by lifestyle, by
the balance of happiness and unhappiness. 5 Finally, and perhaps most
telling, the myth of the homogenous family portrayed in television
sitcoms has been challenged on television itself-consider not only
"All in the Family," but also "My Two Dads," "The Brady Bunch,"
and "Kate and Allie," not to mention an oldie but goody, "My Mother
the Car."
Today there can be no doubt that the variety of social practices
poses new and pressing questions for legal definitions of family, fami-'
ly benefits, and family obligations. No neutral answers, tethered to
"nature" or consensus, are available.6 Instead, the legal rules inevitably
(1974).
3. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting constitutional chal-
lenge to this presumption brought by the man acknowledged by the mother to be the father
of the child).
4. See infra text accompanying note 52 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967)).
5. ARLENE SKOLNICK, EMBATTLED PARADISE: THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN AN AGE OF
UNCERTAINTY 3 (1991).
6. It is hardly the case that "nature" or consensus ever ruled in questions of the
family, yet some historic periods have been characterized by greater social pressures to
create an illusion of consensus about these issues. See id at 49 ("Rarely has an era strived
so hard, in the midst of immense social change, to define the normal and the seemingly
immutable") (quoting THOMAS HINE, POPULUXE: THE LOOK AND LIFE OF AMERICA IN THE
'50's AND '60'S 177 (1986)). Yet the post-war era of the 1950s and 1960s in fact included
a shift toward a family form-the stay-at-home mother with the breadwinner father living
with their children-that departed from patterns in preceding and subsequent decades. lI at
51-52.
1992-93] 277
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register choices, and the immediate task is to articulate and debate the
considerations that should influence those choices.
In this Article, I will sketch those considerations while document-
ing the challenge to conventional understandings posed by the current
diversity of groupings that are candidates for family status. The chal-
lenge to constitutional understandings of family bears a marked resem-
blance to the controversy over multiculturalism in educational contexts,
yet I think we can do better than most of the multicultural debates
have in avoiding rigid, polarized positions. Locating the ambivalence
over pluralism within American history and constitutional traditions
would help; so would clarifying the preconditions for tolerance. These
I take as my tasks in Part One of this Article as I address what con-
siderations should guide legal definitions of families and distributions
of benefits based on family status. In Part Two, I will reconsider this
discussion while examining legal obligations based on family status.
II. NOTHING NATURAL ABOUT IT: LEGAL REGULATION
AND FAMILY DIvERsITY
The most basic evidence that regulation of families reflects cultur-
al choices is the constant theme in American culture that "the family"
is in crisis-and hence, someone should do something about it. News-
papers over the past few years abound with stories about dramatic
shifts in American families.' Historians tell us that Americans have
worried about the family for over three hundred years; the Puritans
began it all by "decrying the increasing fragility of marriage, the
growing selfishness and irresponsibility of parents and the increasing
rebelliousness of children."8 Wary that I am just another decrier in
this tradition of bemoaning the family in crisis, I see two recent pat-
terns of change. The first is the increased gap between legal or con-
ventional definitions of family membership and actual lived practic-
es-that is, the diversity of groups that see themselves as families. The
7. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Changes in Family Patterns: Solitude and Single
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1991, at Al; Pamela Reynolds, Gay Couples Redefine "Fami-
ly," BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1989, at 101.
8. SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 8.
[Vol. 95:275
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second is an apparent rise in the numbers of families composed inter-
nally by people with contrasting religious, ethnic, or racial identi-
ties-or, diversity within families. While the first raises directly ques-
tions for legal rules about who is "family" and what benefits should
attach to family membership, the diversity within families exposes
further complications. Each development, in turn, exposes the unavoid-
able choices for contemporary family law.
A. Diversity of Families
More than a year ago, a New York Times headline announced,
Only One U.S. Family in Four is "Traditional" compared with forty
percent in 1970. 9 The term "traditional" here referred to a married
man and woman living with their children. If the children are their
own-not stepchildren under eighteen-the percentage is even smaller;
only eight to ten percent of all households are families of this sort,
with a wife who does not work outside the home."
Lawful family membership traditionally depended upon marriage,
birth of a child to its biological parents, and adoption. Yet today, dif-
ferent groupings of people are increasingly claiming legal family sta-
tus. The Massachusetts highest court accepted the claim by an unmar-
ried woman to unemployment benefits offered to the legal spouse of
someone who had to move for employment purposes; the woman
claimed that her cohabitation of 13 years should entitle her to those
benefits." A few years ago, New York accorded to the gay lover of
a man who had died the legal protection against eviction from a rent-
controlled apartment that the law grants to spouses of deceased lease-
9. Only One U.S. Family in Four Is "Traditional," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at
A19 (citing census data).
10. See Martha Minow, Redefining Families-Who's In and Who's Out, 62 U. COLO.
L. REV. 269, 274 (1991).
11. Reep v. Commissioner of Dep't of Employment & Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297
(Mass. 1992). After this decision, the legislature overrode an executive veto and amended
the governing statute to prohibit payment of unemployment benefits to anyone who (spouse
or not) who accompanies a person to a new locale. 1992 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 26.
(Westlaw) (H.B. 2935, § 20).
1992-93]
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holders. 12 Thus, the question I pose is which kinds of groups should
be defimed legally as families, and what benefits should accrue because
of this family status?
No responsible discussion of these questions can begin without
first acknowledging how they implicate social and political choices
about distributing privileges. No factual answer can resolve those
choices, nor is it possible for the government to be neutral in the face
of an array of social relationships. As long as the terms "family,"
"parent," and "spouse" carry legal significance, they depart from their
social meanings and even from the meanings people intend when they
apply these terms to themselves.
For example, the legal rules defining "family" for immigration
purposes notably chafe people's actual practices of family life-no
doubt reflecting a public policy to restrict immigration rather than a
conscientious effort to define "family." The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 affords amnesty to undocumented individuals who
meet its requirements-but many of these people have spouses or
children who do not.13 The eligible individuals must choose whether
to stay in this country without their relatives or to leave the country,
and the ineligible individuals must choose whether to remain illegally.
In addition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
treats as a "family unit" for its general practices only those immediate
family members who regularly reside in the same household.14 As
law professor Carol Sanger notes,
The INS definition of family unity fails to acknowledge that for a variety
of reasons many children in this country live with nonparental relatives
outside the family home .... [A]ssume a 14-year-old boy, excludable
because he assisted another alien in entering the country illegally, lives
with his uncle. The boy will not be considered a member of his father's
family group because the boy is functionally part of another family. If,
however, the uncle is also applying for legalization and seeks a waiver on
12. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
13. Tony Arjo, "Family Fairness" Policy Helps Some Newly-Legalized Immigrant
Families, Not Others, YotrrH L. NEws, May-June 1990, at 15; Carol Sanger, Immigration
Reform and Control of the Undocumented Family, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 295, 295-96 (1987).
14. Sanger, supra note 13, at 328-29.
[Vol. 95:275
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behalf of his nephew, the application cannot be granted in the name of
family unity because the nephew is not a member of the uncle's biological
family.15
This kind of scenario is especially likely among families of immigrants
who migrate in waves, often with male relatives arriving first and
sending later for other immediate family members.16 Moreover, many
immigrants share households and treat as family members nieces or
nephews, grandparents, or cousins, which the INS will not include
under its definition of family unit.17
Extended families face special burdens from other governmental
programs as well. Eligibility rules for food stamps and other govern-
ment poverty programs often pose choices between living with family
members or living apart from them.' The United States Supreme
Court has found no defect in regulations that deny separate household
eligibility for food stamps to parents who live not only with their own
children but also with their siblings, even though unrelated families
that share living space may be eligible."9 The irony here is that the
government's policy works against the goal of encouraging relatives to
turn to relatives when they face difficult economic times.2 ° To coun-
ter this, New York began an experiment recognizing kinship ties by
supporting foster care with relatives, but faced a crisis when the num-
ber of participating families seemed too many and too expensive to in-
clude.2 Yet attentiveness to cultural variety especially calls for rec-
15. lad at 329-30 (footnotes omitted); see also INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (per
curiam) (denying petition for suspension of deportation of teenage nieces living with an aunt
because the extreme hardship exemption applies only to spouses, parents, or children).
16. Sanger, supra note 13, at 311-12.
17. See Martha Saenz-Schroeder et al., Family-Sponsored Immigration, 4 GEo. IMMIGR.
L.J. 201, 202 (1990) (comments of Carol Wolchok). In addition, per-country limits produce
long waitings-as long as twelve years-for reuniting children with parents who have be-
come permanent United States residents. Id, at 203.
18. Lucy Billings, The Choice Between Living with Family Members and Eligibility
for Government Benefits Based on Need: A Constitutional Dilemma, 1986 UTAH L. REV.
695.
19. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
20. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); cf. Isabel Wilkerson, Middle-
Class Blacks Try to Grip a Ladder While Lending a Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1990, at
Al.
21. Suzanne Daley, Treating Kin Like Foster Parents Strains a New York Child Agen-
1992-931
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ognizing relationships between grandparents and grandchildren or other
extended family ties.22
Another major discontinuity between law and social practice arises
for gay and lesbian people. Some would say that this is fine, that the
law should not recognize relationships that are immoral, unnatural, or
(in a somewhat circular argument) illegal. Rendering gay and lesbian
relationships illegal is, of course, a social and political choice, and it
is one currently under challenge around the country and, indeed,
around the world.23
For gay and lesbian activists, it is a form of illegitimate discrimi-
nation to deny lawful marriage to gay and lesbian couples,24 to deny
adoption and foster care to gay and lesbian individuals, s and to dis-
cy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1989, at Al; When Relatives Take Children In, N.Y. TIMES; Oct.
28, 1989, at 24. The number of children in the kinship program has skyrocketed since the
program began in 1986. Nearly 45% of the 49,814 children in New York City's foster care
system live in kinship foster homes. New York City Mayor's Management Report, Mayor's
Office of Operations, Fiscal Year 1991.
22. See William A. Vega, Hispanic Families in the 1980s: A Decade of Research, 52
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1015, 1016-17 (1990) (non-nuclear family members are more likely
to contribute to household income in Hispanic than in white households and historically,
Hispanic families are often extended beyond the nuclear group with an additional relative
such as a sibling or cousin of the parents); Melvin N. Wilson, The Context of the African
American Family, in CHiLD WELFARE: AN AFRiCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 85, 93, 101-02 (Joyce
E. Everett et al. eds., 1990) (three times as many African-American children as white chil-
dren under age eighteen live with grandparents and a practice of informal adoption is also
prevalent among African-Americans).
23. Same-sex marriage is not lawful anywhere in the United States, although some
municipalities have recognized domestic partnerships for certain purposes. In 1989, Denmark
recognized the registration of same-sex partnerships which provides homosexual couples with
many of the benefits accorded to marriage, including property inheritance. Adoption of chil-
dren is not enabled by this approach, however, nor is marriage within the Danish church.
Sweden in 1988 granted the same partnership rights to same-sex couples as those available
to heterosexual couples. See Mary P. Truethart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of
"Family,' 26 GoNz. L. REv. 91 (1990-91).
24. Edward A. Slavin, Jr., What Makes a Marriage Legal?, 18 HUM. RTS. 16 (1991)
(ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities); see also Nitya Duclos, Same-Sex
Marriage: Complicating the Question, 1 J. LAW & SEXUALITY 31 (1991) (urging the ques-
tion whether lesbians and gay men, or some of them, benefit from legal recognition of their
relationships rather than asking the government to grant permission for gays or lesbians to
marry).
25. See Babets v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 526 N.E.2d
282
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/5
ALL IN THE FAMILY
advantage homosexual parents in contests over custody of their biologi-
cal children.26 They advocate that it should be unlawful for employ-
ers,' insurance companies,' and other entities to ignore these fami-
ly roles or punish gay and lesbian people because of them-as a state
attorney general did recently in withdrawing a job offer to a woman
because she had undergone a religious marriage ceremony with another
woman.
29
These calls for legal recognition and protection are increasingly
successful.30 As a small sign of the times, or should I say, the stars,
1261 (Mass. 1988) (challenging state policy preferring married and heterosexual applicants as
foster parents); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987) (answers to certified
questions from the legislature: (1) proposed bill prohibiting homosexuals from adopting any
person is constitutional, (2) proposed bill prohibiting homosexuals from being licensed as
members of foster families is constitutional, and (3) proposed bill prohibiting homosexuals
from running licensed day care centers is unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (noting unavailability of
adoption to gay individuals). But see In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992) (grant-
ing adoption to lesbian life partner of six-year-old boy's biological mother, giving equal pa-
rental status to both parents).
26. See Ray Long, ACLU Brief Raps Denial of Custody to Lesbian, CHI. SUN-TIMEs,
Mar. 8, 1991, at 20; Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEo. L.. 459 (1990). Special problems of finding a fair legal forum arise
when lesbian couples separate and then disagree over custody or visitation. See David
Margolick, Child-Custody Cases Test Frontiers of Family Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at
1.
27. See Tamar Lewin, Suit Over Death Benefits Asks, What Is a Family?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at B7 (describing suit against AT&T for refusing to pay benefits to
a lesbian partner after the death of an employee when the company would have paid bene-
fits to a husband).
28. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Insurance for Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1991, at 23.
29. Mark Curriden, A.G. Refuses to Hire Lesbian, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 32 (Geor-
gia Attorney General withdrew job offer to Robin Shahar after she disclosed her upcoming
religious ceremony with another woman; Shahar filed suit claiming equal protection and
freedom of religion and association violations).
30. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989); Robert L. Eblin,
Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for
Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 1067 (1990); James Barron, Bronx Hospital
Gives Gay Couples Spouse Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al; Pamela Reynolds,
Harvard Broadens Its Housing Policy, BOSToN GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1989, at 101 (Harvard Uni-
versity settles case filed with Boston Fair Housing Commission to give eligibility to univer-
sity affiliate apartments to "Harvard graduate students, faculty and staff, whether living
1992-93]
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the Star Tribune in Minneapolis recently started publishing announce-
ments of gay or lesbian "domestic partnerships" on what had previous-
ly been its wedding and announcement page.3"
Many people, however, still believe that gays and lesbians should
be excluded from the privileges of family membership. It will not do,
however, to support this view by reference to nature, convention, or
even religion. Many religions are themselves struggling with these
questions; some are performing marriages for gays and lesbians, some
are ordaining gay and lesbian clergy. Disagreements over these issues
are intense and volatile; they involve the central issues of poli-
tics--who's in or out, and who gets what. Finding sufficiently shared
assumptions with which to resolve these disagreements is itself a chal-
lenge, and in our society, that challenge will inevitably turn to the
legal system-since it is all that we have in common.
It is important to recognize that the resolutions of those conflicts
will, in turn, affect cohabiting heterosexuals and potentially other
groups as well. For example, claims by lesbian partners of women
with children to a kind of equitable parenthood or in loco parentis
right based on performing the functions of a parent could, if recog-
nized, produce legal protection for other informal but functional family
relationships-such as those between aunts who care for children and
boyfriends and the children of their girlfriends. New rules in these
contexts will also reflect the eroding significance of biology to lawful
family membership in light of new reproductive technologies. For if a
woman who contributes no genetic material to the fertilized egg she
carries to term can become the lawful mother, why cannot her cohabit-
ing female lover also become a lawful parent for that child?
New reproductive technologies, gay and lesbian couples, immi-
grants, applicants for food stamps-these may each sound marginal to
family law and to legal defimitions of family. But if you continue to
think that the core legal definitions of family are still safe and uncon-
tested, think again. Consider single parent households-whether never
alone, married, living with someone or involved in a long-term gay or lesbian relationship").
31. Paper Includes Gay Couples on What Was Wedding Page, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1991, at AlO.
[Vol. 95:275
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married or divorced or stepfamilies-or the term I prefer, blended
families. By 1989, nearly twenty-five percent of all children in this
country lived in single parent families, and over half of all African-
American children lived with one parent.3 2 As a result of the com-
bined rates of divorce, separation, and births to unmarried people,
more than half of all white children and three-quarters of all black
children born in the 1970s and 1980s are expected to live for some
portion of their childhoods with only their mothers.3 The number of
children living with unmarried parents doubled between 1980 and
1985. 34 The sheer decline in the use of the term "illegitimate child"
indicates a change, as bearing and keeping, children become more
socially acceptable for unmarried people 35-from movie stars on
down.36 Our rates of single-parent-and divorce-households remain
the highest in the world.37
Furthermore, numerous families are now created through remar-
riage, typically following divorce.38 Reflecting the increase, the Cen-
sus Bureau counted stepfamily households for the first time in 1990.3 9
One observer predicts that half of all young people will live in blend-
32. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RBETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 18 (1991).
33. Id at 20. But note that "family disruption" due to divorce is comparable to dis-
ruption in the last century due to death of a parent. See SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 144
(discussing research by Mary Jo Bane).
34. Michael J. Dale, The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children: Mixed
Blessings, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 523, 523 (1989).
35. SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 188.
36. Cohabitation without marriage also surged during the past decade; interestingly,
here we lag behind Sweden, where one in every five couples is unmarried. Family Trou-
bles, WASH. Q., Spring 1991, at 18. According to Census Bureau statistics, there are ap-
proximately 2.9 million unmarried couples living together in the United States, an 80% in-
crease since 1980. Barringer, supra note 7, at Al.
37. Id.
38. See generally JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES (1990).
39. Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, Remarriage and Stepfamily Research in
the 1980s: Increased Interest in an Old Family Form, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 925 (1990).
What we count shows what we care about; the 1890 Census counted whether a woman had
children and how many were still alive and what percentage of black blood each person
had. Back Issues: How Have We Changed? The 1890 Census Provides One Indication,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1990, at 27.
1992-93]
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ed families by the year 2000, given current rates of divorce and remar-
riage.40
For single parent households, blended families, adoptive families,
gay and lesbian families, and extended families, social practices often
do not match legal definitions of family or law enforcement of family
roles. The rules may say that children of unmarried fathers are eligible
for child support from their fathers but not for public benefits they
would receive if their fathers had married their mothers.4' Unmarried
fathers may be counted as members of the family for some legal pur-
poses even if there is no cohabitation, or not counted even if there is.
Divorced fathers remain fathers, but it is unclear in some legal circum-
stances when they remain members of "the family." States also lack
clarity about the legal and financial obligations, if any, of a stepparent:
if that person has not adopted the child, should the law give no recog-
nition of their relationship if, for example, the stepfather obtains a
divorce and then wishes to visit his ex-wife's child?
While it is socially recognized that the blended family composed
of a mother and her children, a father and his children from another
marriage, and the former spouses or lovers of each adult may act as
one "family"-perhaps an extended family-when, if ever, should the
law recognize such practices? Should the law enforce duties for step-
parents, for example? In her vivid study of two such groupings in
Silicon Valley, California, anthropologist Judith Stacey called them
"Brave New Families," and found people turning to one another as if
they were extended families despite divorces and subsequent remar-
riages.42
40. See Paul Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A Brief Demo-
graphic Analysis, 38 FAM. REL. 24-27 (1989).
41. Compare Jimenez v. Weinberg, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (disabled worker's nonmarital
children born after onset of disability eligible for social security benefits) and Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (nonmarital children entitled to child support) with Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (social security survivorship benefits unavailable to certain
nounarital children absent proof of dependency at time of the worker's death) and Califano
v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (nonmarital children can be denied social security insurance
benefits).
42. STACEY, supra note 38; see also Paul Bohannan, Divorce Chains, Households of
Remarriage, and Multiple Divorcers, in DIVORCE AND AFTER 113-21 (Paul Bohannan ed.,
1970) (describing kinship ties after divorce as a chain, establishing a complex network of
286 [Vol. 95:275
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While some people continue to turn to one another despite divorce
and remarriage, others wish to excise their former relatives after a
divorce. As one teenage character reports in a recent short story,
"Trouble is all those divorces really mess up the photograph al-
bums .... Mom butchered ours. There's only about two pictures left
of Dad in all twelve albums."43 Should private efforts at emotional
excision produce comparable legal results, or should the law assure
that Dad stays, in some way, part of the family?'
Related questions surround changes in adoption of children. Shift-
ing from an era of sealed documents-part of the myth that no adop-
tion had happened-some adoptive parents now meet the birth mothers,
and some experiment with "open adoption" in which an adopted child
maintains ties with both the biological and adoptive parents. If these
groups of parents function as a kind of extended family, should the
legal definition of who is a parent be modified?4 5 Or should law pre-
serve the notion of exclusive parenthood and terminate all legal ties
with the biological parent after adoption?
4 6
My own intuition favors expansive definitions. I am not alone. As
one observer commented recently, "[I]ncreasingly America seems to be
agreeing with the concept of family as those who love each other and
want to work to support each other."47 The American Home Econom-
ics Association defines a family unit as "two or more persons who
potential relationships).
43. Pamela Painter, New Family Car, in THE GRAYWoLF ANNUAL EIGHT: THE NEw
FAMILY 240, 244 (Scott Walker ed., 1991).
44. Some studies suggest that parents and children do not mention stepchildren and
stepparents living in their household when asked to describe who is in their families. See
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS
TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 79 (1991).
45. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION (1990).
46. See Katherine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988).
47. Pamela Reynolds, supra note 7, at 101; see also Slavin, supra note 24, at 17 (cit-
ing a Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Poll in which 74% of adults defined family as
"a group of people who love and care for each other"). Eighty-one percent of Americans
view family as the primary source of pleasure in life-and 51% of parents also viewed it
as one of the greatest sources of worry. See Edward F. Zigler & Elizabeth P. Gilman, An
Agenda for the 1990s: Supporting Families, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW CoMMr-
MENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY 237 (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990).
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share resources, share responsibility for decisions, share values and
goals, and have a commitment to one another over time ... regardless
of blood, legal ties, adoption, or marriage.
"
,
48
Yet these definitions do not match most current legal rules def'm-
ing family, marriage, or parenthood. Should the rules change to reflect
these views or instead continue to discipline or constrain them?
49
Should shifting legal and informal practices defining family member-
ship also alter the benefits and obligations attached to family roles? I
hope I have demonstrated that the answers to these questions are not
obvious nor answerable by reference to nature or convention. But
before I defend an expansive, or tolerant, view, we need to consider
the additional complication of diversity within families.
B. Diversity Within Families
One function of families in this society is to nurture cultural di-
versity; in private homes and communities, families engage in varied
religious, ethnic, and lifestyle practices that reflect and in turn support
the national commitment to liberty.50  Respecting the autonomy of
each family in many ways ensures the continuation of social diversity
as parents raise their children according to their own values and tradi-
tions. We could enforce this diversity, but we do not: our legal system
does not pursue the route taken by several other multicultural societies
48. Slavin, supra note 24, at 18; see also Thomas Palmer, All in the Family, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1992, at 77 ("Liberals were successful, during the 1970s, in getting the
family defined more broadly, the word eventually encompassing virtually any two people
living together."). Mark Poster criticizes functional definitions of family for neglecting the
quality of relationships and uniqueness of each family. MARK POSTER, CRITICAL THEORY OF
THE FAMILY 143 (1978). Nonetheless, he offers this notion: "The family is the social space
where generations confront each other directly and where the two sexes define their differ-
ences and power relations." Id. Even this capacious notion may exclude some groupings,
such as same-sex cohabitation.
49. A study of children's concept of the family indicates that young children rely
upon common residence and contact between members to determine who is in the family
while older children rely on blood or legal relationship. Rhoda L. Gilby & David R.
Pederson, The Development of the Child's Concept of the Family, 14 CAN. J. BEHAV. Scl.
110 (1982).
50. See David Blankenhorn, Introduction to REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMIT-
MENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY xi, xiii (David Blankenhrom et al. eds., 1990).
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which assign each person a "personal law," or the specific legal rules
accompanying his or her religious traditi.in, such as Hindu, Moslem,
Jewish, or Christian."'
Perhaps we do not have such rules because we believe, in a cer-
tain sense, that every family is characterized by diversity. If the birth
of a child is the triggering act in the creation of a family, surely this
involves the diversity of generations. Any two people who come to-
gether in marriage join two distinct family cultures, embedded ways of
squeezing the toothpaste, expressing disagreements, and relating to
others. The Sunday after my sister married her husband-with whom
she had lived for the prior six years-she rolled out of bed and asked
when he was going to the delicatessen to get the cold cuts. He looked
at her with confusion, asked why he should go, she burst into tears,
and two hours later she realized that as a child, growing up, my Dad
would go out every Sunday to the delicatessen and pick up cold cuts.
My sister also realized that she does not even like cold cuts, but she
found she had brought to her new family-the one created by her
marage-a set of expectations about which she had not even been
conscious and which certainly surprised her husband.
But specific forms of diversity within families in this country
reflect the transcendence of higher barriers and more profound
separatisms than those that distinguish delicatessen-going families from
others. The history of racial segregation in families is a striking exam-
51. Personal law, determined by religious affiliation, governs the family lives of Hin-
dus, Moslems, and others religious communities in India. See Jamie Cassels, Bitter Knowl-
edge, Vibrant Action: Reflections of Law and Society in Modem India, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
109. Personal law based on religious affiliation is a kind of "autonomy regime" for minori-
ties that might otherwise be ungulfed by the dominant majority. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals
and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NoTRE DAME
L. REV. 1539 (1991). The closest practices in the United States may be Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed infra text accompanying note 84 and the Indian
Child Welfare Act according tribes jurisdiction and standing to intervene in state actions
affecting the custody of Indian children. Yet this statute in operation has not assured Indian
control and raises new questions because it curtails the rights of Indian parents to choose
placements for their children. See Joan H. Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe:
The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L. REV.
451, 500 (1989); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1903, 1911-1923,
1931-1934, 1951, 1952, 1963 (1988).
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pie. The legacy of slavery 'and racism included legal rules against
interracial marriage and restrictions against interracial adoption. The
1967 Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia rejected state laws
forbidding interracial marriage.52 It was a landmark case for racial
justice as well as for the constitutional status of family law.
Interracial adoption, long unheard of, became an experiment in the
1960s and remains a subject of controversy. My colleague Elizabeth
Bartholet argues that opposition to it reflects a segregative spirit that
should have no place in American law and too often consigns non-
white children to foster care or institutions rather than assuring them
parents of their own race.53 In a refreshingly courageous judgement,
the Supreme Court in 1984 rejected a divorced white father's challenge
to a white mother's custody of their child solely on the grounds that
the mother was cohabiting with (and later married) an African-Ameri-
can man.54 The Court reasoned:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do
not exist .... There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a
different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not
present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic
origin.
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and
the possibility of injury they might inflicf are permissible considerations
for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We
have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them .... The effects
of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification re-
moving an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be
an appropriate person to have such custody.
55
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). A powerful, precursor decision reaching
the same result appears in Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (Traynor, J.). The
dissent in Perez also shows that the quesdon was by no means uncontested. Id. at 35
(Shenk, ., dissenting).
53. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991).
54. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
55. Id. at 433-34 (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, at least in theory,56 the legal system is not supposed to bow to
prejudices against racial diversity within families.
Similar but less high profile patterns have emerged with religious
diversity within families. The longstanding practice of religious match-
ing by adoption agencies-through which a child born to parents of a
particular religion would be matched with adoptive parents of the same
religion-is much in decline, and legally unacceptable if it produces
unequal treatment and delays in the adoption process.57 And while
religious institutions and clergy may decline to approve or perform
interreligious marriages, secular marriages remain available for unions
of men and women from different religions. If, however, those couples
have children and then divorce, special problems may arise over the
children's religious upbringing and practices. Consider three exam-
ples:58
-A mother seeks and obtains a restraining order prohibit-
ing her ex-husband, a Mormon, from engaging their children
in any religious activity, discussion, or attendance during
visitation. The appellate court lifts the restraining order "due
to the absence of evidence of harm to the children and our
resulting belief that the order represents an unwarranted intru-
sion into family privacy. 59
56. The sobering footnote to reality here is that the child lived with the white father
during the litigation-without court approval-and the father ultimately obtained an opportu-
nity to claim lawful custody. Palmore v. Sidoti, 472 So. 2d 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(permitting proceeding in Texas to resolve the child's best interests).
57. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988) (court approves settlement
between the City of New York and child care advocates limiting religious matching in
foster care to ensure placement on a first-come-first-serve basis). See generally Donald
Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and
Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 (1989); Note, Religious Matching Statute
and Adoption, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 262 (1976). But see Gregory A. Horowitz, Accommoda-
tion and Neutrality Under the Establishment Clause: The Foster Care Challenge, 98 YALE
L.J 617, 624 (1989) (17 states require or prefer religious matching in adoption placements).
58. See generally Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Dis-
putes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984);
Ann Berlin, An Overview of Recent Religious Custody Disputes: Towards a Framework for
Equitable Resolutions (unpublished paper, Apr. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
59. Mentry v. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 844 (Ct. App. 1983); accord Munoz v.
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-A mother seeks a restraint against the father from caus-
ing or allowing their children to violate the Jewish Sabbath
and dietary laws during their visits with him. The court denies
it on the grounds that such an order would violate the father's
constitutional right to freely exercise his own religion? °
-A mother obtains physical custody of a child but the
father obtains "spiritual custody," meaning he is entrusted
with inculcating a religious tradition no longer observed by
the custodial parent.61
I will examine the rationales in these cases in some detail because
they illuminate how diversity within families can pose challenges to
the very defmition of family and to the privileges or benefits accompa-
nying family membership. They also show the complications that come
with a tolerance for interreligious families.
In a post-divorce situation with parents of different religions, what
should the law treat as the family unit-that is, who is in the "fami-
ly"-for purposes of protecting family privacy or balancing interests
within the family? What privileges of parenthood should be preserved
in this circumstance? In addressing this question, can the state maintain
Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1971). Other courts in contrast have relied on psychologist
evidence that exposing a child to two different religious traditions would per se harm a
child and therefore issued a restraint against the noncustodial parent. See, e.g., Morris v.
Morris, 412 A.2d 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). Another enjoined the father from taking his
children to Assembly of God meetings because the parents' dispute over religion would
cause future harm to the children. Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917 (Minn..Ct. App.
1986).
60. Brown v. Szakal, 514 A.2d 81 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); see also In re
Tisckos, 514 N.E.2d 523 (111. App. Ct, 1987) (allowing noncustodial parent to take child to
his church rather than mother's church during visitation time); Kelly v. Kelly, 524 A.2d
1330 (NJ. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (rejecting custodial parent's request, based on her as-
sertion of the commands of her Catholic faith, for a restraint against the father to prohibit
overnight visits of their children in his home in the presence of unrelated persons of the
opposite sex because the psychological expert in the case that greater harm would come to
the children by suggesting that the father is a bad man than by exposing them to his life-
style).
61. Dick Johnson, Struggle for Custody of Children's Faith Becomes Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1988, at 1 (describing case of Jerold Simms and Dorothy Boeke).
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neutrality toward religion and toward two parents while also protecting
the children?
In the first case, the custodial mother left the Mormon church
when she separated from her husband, and she sought then to restrict
the husband's ability to require the children to engage in Mormon
religious activities. The court treated the question as one concerning
the risk of harm to the children and rejected testimony by an expert
that conflicting religious views would be harmful to the children be-
cause the expert had not examined the particular children involved. 62
The court relied on the reasoning of a judge in another jurisdiction
who wrote that
"If the dominating goal of the enterprise is to serve a child's best inter-
ests... then it might be thought to follow that a policy of stability or
repose should be adopted by which the child would be exposed to but one
religion (presumably that of the custodial parent) at whatever cost to the
'liberties' of the other parent. The law, however, tolerates and even en-
courages up to a point the child's exposure to the religious influences of
both parents although they are divided in their faiths. This, we think, is
because the law sees value in 'frequent and continuing contact' of the
child with both its parents and thus contact with the parents' separate
religious preferences. There may also be a value in letting the child see,
even at an early age, the religious models between which it is likely to be
led to choose in later life."63
The court thus treated religion as a matter of ultimately individual
choice. Parental prerogatives remain unconstrained by the governmental
obligation to guard children from harm in the absence of evidence of
physical or emotional problems to the children arising from exposure
to two religions.64 Perhaps most striking is the court's decision to
define the "family" to include both divorced spouses and their children
in one unit. The court endorses the "salutary judicial disinclination to
interfere with family privacy without the evidentiary establishment of
compelling need."65
62. Mentry v. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (CL App. 1983).
63. d at 846-47 (quoting Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981)).
64. Id
65. 1& at 847.
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Who is in the family entitled to such privacy? Note that the ex-
husband-is included in this protected sphere: "The rationale that sup-
ports judicial respect for family privacy does not lose its force upon
the dissolution of marriage where, as here, a family relationship-even
a disharmonious one-continues between the former spouses in con-
nection with the rearing of their minor children.
6
The dissenting judge in this case, however, painted a contrasting
picture. This judge brought out unrebutted evidence at trial that the
mother developed the belief that the father was sexually molesting
their daughter: "She appealed to her bishop for help and was rebuffed,
being told that the issue was not a 'moral' one. The crisis in confi-
dence experienced by the mother led to a dissolution from husband
and a break with the Mormon Church."'67 The mother joined a differ-
ent church and perceived that the children experienced confusion in
reconciling the beliefs of the two parents, compounded, in her view,
by the husband's presentation of Mormon materials during his visits
with the children. The dissenting judge viewed the reasons for the
mother's separation from both husband and church as relevant to the
assessment of the children's best interests; that judge also urged a
reading of the court's duty to guard children from harm as including
future, not only past harm.68 This dissenting view exposes the trouble
with the majority's definition of the divorced couple and their children
as one family unit entitled to family privacy and raises a sharp ques-
tion about the court's justification for seeking a neutral stance with re-
gard to the conflict presented in the case.
In the second case, a mother sought to restrain her husband from
causing the children to violate Jewish traditions, including dietary laws,
during his visits with the children. Here the court reasoned that it
"must neither violate the mother's or the children's constitutional right
to religious freedom nor permit the imposition upon the father of the
66. Id at 848. Somewhat crudely, the court at that point cites in support judicial
respect for family units in the absence of a marriage. The reference is crude because it
relies on Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), which concerned the rights of an unmar-
ried father to qualify as a custodian after the mother of the children died. Id at 849.
67. Id at 851 (Miller, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 851-52.
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mother's religion which imposition would violate the father's constitu-
tional right of freedom of religion.' ,69 The court reasoned that the
mother could not use the court to impose her religious practices on her
ex-husband, even though she has the right to select the religious up-
bringing of the child.7" In essence preserving the father's privilege to
influence the children's religious upbringing, the court stated that it
intended to promote a strong relationship with the noncustodial par-
ent71 while also remaining impartial toward religion.
The court acknowledged the risk of harm to the children from
confrontation with conflicting values, but nonetheless concluded that
society is pluralistic and that each individual must balance the conflict
between competing commitments to the state and to one's own ethnic
or religious heritage.7 2 Here, the court made much of the choices al-
ready made by the mother-not only had she divorced and remarried,
she had also converted from Christianity to Judaism. The court rea-
soned that she created a "personal pluralism" with "voluntarily ob-
tained dichotomies" 73-and thus the children would share that plural-
ism.
In this light, the court treated as self-interest-beyond parental
privilege-the mother's effort to shield the children from alien influ-
ences or temptation to depart from their religious practices.74 The
court also suggested that the father try to be sensitive to their views
"so as not to have them see him as a contradiction in their lives."75
But the court would not grant to the custodial parent a power to be
used to exclude the father's contrasting religious views and practices
as a factor in the children's lives.76 The court thus curbed the moth-
69. Brown v. Szakal, 514 A.2d 81, 83 (NJ. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1986) (emphasis
added).
70. It
71. Id
72. Ii at 84.
73. Ad
74. Id. at 84-85. "[S]he opts for self interest which here must yield to the welfare of
the community generally and the father and the children, particularly." d at 85. The father
is treated as both alien and as the community whose interests must be balanced with the
mother's individual interests.
75. Id
76. The court reassured itself that the children in this instance were already so well
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er's privileges in deference to the father's and expressed confidence
that the children would be able to choose their religious practices in
light of their mother's guidance when, later, they gained independent
reason.
In the third case, the noncustodial father obtained spiritual custody
of the child, thus exercising the prerogative to determine the child's
religious upbringing. That case marks an exception to the usual prac-
tice of according to the custodial parent the right to determine the
child's religious upbringing and training.77 Yet even if the custodial
parent is granted that right, the courts must still struggle with the
competing claims of a noncustodial parent to religious freedom and to
a right to expose the child to his religious practice.78
As these three cases indicate, diversity within families complicates
analysis of who is within the family and what benefits accompany
family membership. Parental prerogatives such as guiding a child's re-
ligious upbringing become complicated when the parents themselves
disagree. The secular state, committed to neutrality about religion, then
faces a special problem. How can it avoid imposing any particular reli-
gious view-that is, how can it remain neutral-while still performing
its function of protecting children? The usual judicial answer, demon-
strated by these cases, is to turn to the language of children's interests
and harms, to consider the testimony of psychologists, and to count on
a notion of individual choice for parents and for children as they grow
into individuals capable of mature independent reason.
Yet, this usual judicial answer demonstrates the impossibility of
neutrality in these cases,7 9 for the emphasis on individual choice of
grounded in their religion that "when they reach the age of mature independent reason they
will be sufficiently secure in their custodial parent's religion of choice that they will not
misplace the concern of their mother or their rabbis." Id
77. See, e.g., S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Pam. Ct. 1989).
78. In an unusual case, a custodial mother who had converted from Judaism after the
divorce nonetheless agreed to continue to raise the children as Jews; the court rejected the
argument offered by the Jewish father that this would violate the mother's own religious
freedom. S.LJ. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
79. Cf Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865
(1989).
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religion neglects the possibility that the sheer fact of being posed with
a choice about religious identity alters the child's relationship to reli-
gion. Some religions do not treat religious identity as a choice but
instead an inheritance. Others treat choice itself as a threat to the
religion's integrity.8° Even the child who reaffirms the religion of his
custodial parent in the face of exposure to his noncustodial parent's
religion has a different relationship to religion than one who had no
such sustained exposure.8" The difficulty is not just the legal
system's, but the children's and the parents'. This impossibility of
judicial neutrality toward religion in these cases mirrors the impossibil-
ity of avoiding choice in the legal definitions of "family" and articula-
tions of benefits of family membership.
We face choices about who should be treated as families and what
benefits and freedoms should people receive as family members. Yet
how should we make such choices? I think we first need to acknowl-
edge that we cannot be neutral about them. I also advocate tolerance
in making these choices-but tolerance itself is a substantive value that
departs from neutrality. Tolerance can be chosen only as a tradeoff
against other values. This is a slippery point, so let me elaborate and
locate it in our constitutional tradition.
III. A TRADmON OF TENSIONS
Committed to equality and liberty, riven by legacies of differences
and discrimination, our legal system reflects simultaneous devotion to
neutrality toward-or better yet, tolerance of-private choices and
devotion to officially articulated values. For example, the First Amend-
Unrestricted state supervision of family life's private sphere is inconsistent with the
most basic of democratic and constitutional theories. Yet a stance of total noninter-
vention is also impossible, because some forms of regulation are needed to protect
against other forms. To protect some family members and family choices from in-
trusion is to expose others to intrusion.
leL at 891-92 (footnote omitted).
80. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81. The effort to articulate a child's interests in psychological terms, distinct from
religious identity, indicates a collision between a secular and religious world view as well
as an example of the lawyer's gift for treating as if they were separate two inextricably
connected things.
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ment stands as a protection of religious liberty and governmental neu-
trality toward religion and yet in repeated decisions, it also expresses,
through judicial interpretation, what the secular or dominant forces in
the society will not accept, ranging from polygamy12 to the use of
peyote in religious ceremonies.83 Similarly, both religious and family
freedoms protect the autonomy of the Amish who resist compulsory
school law as an incursion on their way of life,84 and yet neither reli-
gious nor family freedoms can shield a parent or guardian from a
child labor law applied to forbid a child from distributing religious
leaflets on the street85 or from conviction for child endangerment for
withholding medical treatment due to religious belief.86 Commitment
to subgroup autonomy justifies deference to an Indian tribunal with
regard to questions of sex discrimination in the treatment of tribal
inheritance laws, 7 but subgroup autonomy has not been accorded suf-
ficient weight to justify excusing children from public school sessions
involving texts that offend their parents' religious views.88
Yet the question remains of whether the legal system can respect
the choices of private individuals and groups while also implementing
specific values that limit those choices. Navigating between these two
alternatives is especially tricky when courts deal with religious differ-
ences within families such as the custody and visitation cases previous-
ly discussed. "Neutrality" in some absolute sense is not an option; 9
instead, there is the choice between deference to private freedom and
the alternative of publicly imposed values.
Consider the problem faced by courts when one parent's religious
beliefs call for shunning the other parent-what stance toward child
82. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
83. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
84. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
85. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
86. People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct. App. 1991).
87. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (rejecting claim of a private
right of action in federal court under the Indian Civil Rights Act in deference to tribal
sovereignty).
88. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
89. Cf LEE C. BOLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EX-
TREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (tolerance must be understood as a value, not merely a
pragmatic virtue or the results of neutral arbitration).
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custody and visitation could a court take and remain neutral? Either
the court will favor the stringent religious belief or hinder it.9° No
neutrality is possible even if the courts leave it to the parties to work
things out privately, for then the court effectively "perpetuates the
child's role as a pawn in his parents' tug-of-war."91
A similar problem arises beyond the context of religious divisions.
How can the legal system defer to private freedoms in forming fami-
lies while at the same time adopting policies to support families or to
protect children? The very choice of a legal definition of family curbs
private freedoms, especially when that definition is used to distinguish
those who are eligible for a benefit-immigration, food stamps, social
security, and the like9-from those who are not. At the same time,
deference to private freedoms itself is ambiguous: whose freedoms are
to be protected in the context of family life-which adults, and which
children?
We could work for legal rules that do not recognize the "family"
in distributing benefits and instead confer benefits solely of individuals
regardless of family status. That, too, is a preference-a preference
against preferring particular groupings of people. In practice, however,
this may work out to be a preference for the conventional groups
already privileged as family by social institutions. As long as "family,"
"spouse," and "parent" are used as legal and social terms in allocating
benefits, legal, and thus political and social, decisions will articulate
which groupings to value or prefer.
Some people call for a return to the "traditional" family and argue
against expanding the definition of "family" to include gay and lesbian
couples, extended families, and other groupings. 93 Some may view the
90. See Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1967). The trial court in that
case had given custody to the father after the mother testified that she would direct the
child to "shun" his father due to her religious beliefs. The appellate court returned custody
to the mother after she agreed not to interfere with the father's visitation rights. Id. at 505,
517; see Justin K. Miller, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't: Religious Shunning
and the Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 297-98 (1988).
91. Berlin, supra note 58, at 26.
92. See generally Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989) (discussing how marriage prohibitions impose severe economic
burdens on gay couples).
93. This theme characterizes some of the essays in REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW
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trends of increased single-parenthood, unmarried parents, divorce, and
gay and lesbian families as eroding the basic values of the society.
These people may find proposals for supporting these developments94
noxious and a threat to the order that sustains their liberty. Especially
concerned with assuring economic self-sufficiency within families,
people with this view may support contemporary proposals for reform-
ing the welfare system, such as proposals to promote marriage and
deter childbearing by poor people.
95
Perhaps the constraints on the freedom of poor people do not
trouble proponents of such proposals, but efforts to recreate traditional
families more generally would be quite coercive, draconian, and likely
to fail. As Stephanie Coontz wrote in her piece Pro-Family But Di-
vorced From the Facts:
To establish the family wage system, in which married men supposedly
support all mothers and children within self-sufficient families, would
require either mandating abortion and birth control for our nation's unmar-
ried women or equipping them with chastity belts, prohibiting divorce
except among the rich, obliging unwed mothers to give up their children
for adoption, and forcing prospective adoptive couples to accept the black,
racially mixed, older white, and disabled children who now cannot find
homes.'
What one may call order, another may call bias; what one may
call traditional values, another may call exclusion.97 Consider a case
like Shirley Cheng's, a seven-year-old with severe juvenile rheumatoid
arthritis. The state charged her mother, a naturalized United States
COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY, supra note 47.
94. For a statement of such proposals, see SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 209 ("Although
there is little that government or business can do directly to turn around trends in family
structure, policy choices such as child care, parental leave, opportunities for both parents to
work part-time while children are young, and measures to fight poverty and joblessness can
alleviate some of the current strains on families").
95. See Wisconsin Assembly Bill 91 (parental responsibility pilot program 1991) (of-
fering no increase in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the birth of a
new child to a woman already eligible for AFDC and offering benefits even if the parents
are married and live together).
96. Stephanie Coontz, Pro-Family but Divorced from the Facts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
1989, at 10.
97. See generally CHILD WELFARE: AN AFRICENTRIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 22.
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citizen born in China, with neglect because she would not approve of
surgery for her daughter and wanted instead to return to China to
undertake physical theory and herbal medicine.98 As the hospital
spokesperson explained, the problem arose because the mother was
denying "the only opportunity to prevent this child from living with a
lifelong crippling condition."' Yet the lawyer from the American
Civil Liberties Union who represented the mother argued that "[w]hat
is outrageous is that powerful people, the institutions and the doctors,
are throwing away a brand of medicine practiced by two-thirds of the
world. 1 °0
Such a debate echoes contemporary arguments over
multiculturalism in schools and universities. There, too, we hear claims
that the ever expanding inclusion of diverse cultures and materials is
impossible and threatens core values with relativism and low standards;
there, too, we hear arguments that a return to tradition is coercive and
out of touch with actual people and practices. Although some construc-
tive discussions are emerging in this context, there has been a lot of
namecalling and misstating of opponents' positions. I worry especially
about the rigidity and polarization of these debates. I think we can do
better there, and also in discussions of family law. To begin, we can
locate each of these discussions within the long debates in this country
over diversity and unity.
98. James Feron, Can Choosing Form of Care Become Neglect?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 1990, at Al, A28. Shirley's mother, Juliet Cheng, sued the Connecticut Department of
Youth Services in federal court and alleged constitutional violations for the deprivation of
custody and control over her child's care, moral, and religious treatment. Cheng v. Wheaton,
745 F. Supp. 819, 820 (D. Conn. 1990). The federal court agreed that Mrs. Cheng had
been denied due process rights when the state juvenile court refused to hear testimony from
Mrs. Cheng's homeopathic physician. IL at 823. Granting a preliminary injunction barring
surgery and permitting a trial period for homeopathic treatment, the court also called for a
panel of experts to evaluate the need for surgery. That panel voted 2-1 against the surgery;
one of the physicians believed that the surgery would help but absent the family's support
for subsequent physical therapy, the operation would be pointless. The hospital discharged
Shirley; the state dropped all charges of abuse or neglect. Telephone Interview with
Newington Children's Hospital spokesperson (Mar. 23, 1992).
99. Feron, supra note 98, at A28.
100. Id at Al.
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However, you should always beware of anyone who pretends to
tell the history of a country while standing on one foot, or while be-
ginning to close Part One of a two-part Article as I am now. Consider
yourselves forewarned! Yet the perspective afforded by even this fore-
shortened history can enhance our discussions. Peter Stuyvesant, repre-
sentative of the Dutch West India Company that established what later
became New York, wrote to his company in Holland for advice about
whether to admit a group of Jews. He warned that admitting the Jews
would lead to admitting Catholics, Lutherans, and Quakers-and that,
of course, is exactly what happened. Because he implemented his
company's call for admitting the Jews, Stuyvesant became a hero for
American pluralism, despite his personal views. He followed the direc-
tion of his company.1"
A more complex ambivalence characterized the framers of the
Constitution. They had subcommunities very much on their minds
when they crafted a political scheme to guard against factions, yet they
also assumed and intended to protect the family structures and church-
es that they knew."° Perhaps they hoped that an overarching cultural
unity would support toleration of diversity while also eroding that
diversity."°3 They presumed a cultural unity supporting the constitu-
tional order would serve as the precondition for tolerance of diversity;
they treated the government as somehow beyond the battle among sub-
groups but nonetheless sought loyalty to it and its distinctive val-
ues.
104
The Civil War erupted over slavery but also over a clash between
Southern and Northern cultures and economies. Its aftermath produced
ongoing conflicts over inclusion and exclusion of blacks by whites.
101. See SOLOMON GRAZEL, A HISTORY OF THE JEws 502-04 (1947). The Dutch West
India Company directors responded to Stuyvesant that a number of Jews in European Am-
sterdam had become stockholders in the company, and many of the Jews seeking admittance
to the New Netherlands had fought for Holland in South America; therefore, they deserved
to be admitted. Id at 503.
102. See William C. MacWilliams, American Pluralism: The Old Order Passeth, in
THE AMERICANS 296, 297 (Irving Kristol & Paul Weaver eds., 1976).
103. Id. at 299-301. Thus, MacWilliams argues that the framers presumed widely
shared traditional beliefs and virtues, including belief in a conventional family, and yet they
set in motion possibilities that would alter it.
104. Id.
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The progressive reformers at the turn of this century worried that
immigrants would maintain group loyalties that would interfere with
assimilation and hold the society back. °5 During the very same peri-
od, the Catholic church promoted ethnic parishes that preserved dis-
tinctive cultural traditions of the new immigrants."°  Pluralists
throughout this century promoted inclusion even while implying a
basic faith in shared groundrules for the society, however diverse its
members. Some critics argue, however, that the pluralists failed to
sustain those ground rules that permitted tolerance itself. 7 Although
others assert that the core shared value in America is commitment to
constitutionalism which asserts respect for difference.'08 Also threat-
ening the inclusionary impulse, nativist forces opposed to new waves
of immigrants resurface almost every decade.'09
Philosopher Joshua Halberstam may have put it best when he
asserted that genuine tolerance is impossible, because anyone with
truly held convictions believes they and not another set are correct,
and yet only those with convictions can be tolerant. 0 At the same
time, Halberstam notes that "we can limit intolerance by limiting our
convictions; by restricting the 'extent' of our convictions as well as
their sheer number, we can avoid unwarranted intolerance."' He
urges efforts to distinguish what we really think is fundamental from
what-we care about but need not treat as incompatible with toleration
for others. We thus can expand the sphere for freedom while defend-
ing its limits in terms that can be understood and argued over by
many other people.
Because I favor an expansive sphere for private freedom, I defend
a tolerant, and thus expansive, response to legal claims of family
105. If at 306-09; ROBERT H. WIEE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967).
106. R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUrSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICANS
63-71 (1986).
107. See MacWilliams, supra note 102, at 318; Martin E. Marty, Pluralists Take It On
the Chin-Deservedly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1988, at 23.
108. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths of Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986).
109. Id
110. Joshua Halberstam, The Paradox of Tolerance, 14 PHILA. F. 190 (1982-83).
111. Id at 199.
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membership. I doubt the value of state standardization and social stig-
ma directed towards groups of people who depart from the state-sanc-
tioned model of the family. I think the values signaled by "family" are
worthwhile and yet fragile; stability, nurturance and care should be
promoted wherever possible, and people committed to taking on these
tasks should be encouraged to do so. These ideas foreshadow my
argument in Part Two of this Article.
In Part One, I chiefly have explored a paradox. I have argued that
it is not possible for the government to be neutral about families, just
as it is not possible for a school to be neutral about the values and
cultural images it teaches. Yet I have also suggested that it is possible,
and commendable, to restrict the kind of commitments that make toler-
ance for others difficult or impossible.
This approach may seem most difficult when it comes to thinking
about families-as a teacher of mine once said, "One of the difficult
things about the family as a topic is that everyone in the discussion
feels obliged to defend a particular set of choices." n1 2 Perhaps, ironi-
cally, the intensity of debate over families reflects not just our diversi-
ty but also a national commonality. Arlene Skolnick recently comment-
ed:
Since the nineteenth century, Americans have looked to the family as the
source of individual and social salvation. Europeans, by contrast, have
looked at the family as a fragile institution in need of support from the
wider society . . . . The emphasis on the home as the source of both
personal happiness and social order has been responsible for the recurring
sense of crisis concerning children and the family that has afflicted Amei-
dan culture since the 1820's."3
The great expectations we bring to our own families and to the idea of
the family actually may reflect something missing beyond families-a
realm of social life and social meaning beyond home and also beyond
workplaces. Perhaps we can reduce our intolerance toward family
groupings we do not recognize by working for sociability in more
places beyond families.
112. SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 200 (quoting Joseph Featherstone).
113. Id at 200, 223.
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As we each participate in constructing our own families, and in
claiming benefits and privileges of family status, can we also .contrib-
ute to a constructive public debate about how society should define
family and family benefits and privileges? Can we acknowledge the
impossibility of neutrality and the inevitability of choice? Can we
refrain from characterizing our own preferences as natural, consensual,
or obvious, given the extensive disagreements on these issues? Can we
articulate a possibility of tolerance and commitment to particular val-
ues? Stay tuned as I pursue and reconsider these questions in Part
Two as I turn from "All in the Family" to "In All Families-Loving
and Owing."
PART TWO: IN ALL FAMILIES-LOVING AND OWING
I. INTRODUCTION
What do you owe a member of your family-however you define
"family"? Financial support? How about an organ? Bone marrow?
What does a child owe a sibling? Can a parent approve the trans-
planting of one sibling's organ into another-or would this breach the
parent's duty to preserve and protect each child's interests?
Tamas Bosze of Hoffman Estates, Illinois brought these issues to
public attention when he sought to test the bone marrow of two chil-
dren he had fathered out-of-wedlock; Tamas hoped to find a donor
match for an older son who was dying of leukemia. As one commen-
tator put it,
Would even the most loving family members want to be forced by the
courts to donate a kidney or retina to an ailing child or sibling? The
chemistry of love and courage often inspires one relative to donate organs
to another. But to do so is an act of will, born of the impulses of a gen-
erous individual-not the mandate of the law. 11
4
Tamas's lawyers argued that by participating in a transplant, the half-
brothers would benefit: insofar as they would avoid the pain of know-
114. Nancy Gibbs, The Gift of Life-or Else, TIME, Sept. 10, 1990, at 70.
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ing that they might have been able to save the life of their half-broth-
er, but did not.1 5 But the mother of the younger boys reasoned that,
as a mother, she had to focus on protecting her children from potential
complications from the procedures requested by the father of the chil-
dren.
This is an unusual problem. Yet, in many ways, it resembles other
problems of family obligation. For example, how much child support
should a noncustodial father owe, especially after he fathers new chil-
dren with another woman? Should he be able to reduce the support
payments to children he fathered in an earlier marriage or relationship
because of these new obligations, or should the initial obligations
remain unchanged? These questions resemble those raised by the bone
marrow transplant in that a parent may have obligations to more than
one child as well as to himself or herself. Yet should these obligations
be defined? Contemporary industrialized societies lack clear answers
about the scope and definition of family duties." 6
By looking to family duties, I mean to include issues of moral as
well as legal responsibility. While these are potentially distinct issues,
they also mutually inform each other. Indeed, emphasizing distinctions
at the cost of connections is a mistake when such emphasis disguises
how mutual impact and influence work-a point I will return to sever-
al times in this discussion. It reminds me, though, of one definition of
legal re.soning as thinking about two inextricably connected things as
if they were detached.1 17 Some of the difficulties in defining family
obligations, I will argue, arise from just this kind of thinking.
Before examining other difficulties in defining family obligations,
I will defend a conviction alongside my plea for tolerance in answers
115. Cf Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (court approves donations of a
kidney by a mentally impaired person to his ailing brother).
116. See, e.g., JANET FINCH, FAMILY OBLIGATIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 177-78 (1989)
(summarizing research revealing absence among contemporary British people of a clear sense
of the content of family obligations and recommending normative guidelines to clarify these
duties).
117. Attributed to Thomas Reed Powell, the quotation appears paraphrased by Lon
Fuller: Thomas Reed Powell used to say that if you can think about something that is
related to something else without thinking about the thing to which it is related, then you
have the legal mind." LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 4 (1969).
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to the questions of who are members of a family and what benefits
should accompany family membership. Yet when it comes to obliga-
tions of family membership, I think a less generous and more strict
approach is justifiable. One way to explain this is by reference to
notions of consent or acceptance-that is, if someone claims family
membership and the benefits that go along with it, this person may
also be said to consent to and accept the obligations that attach to
family roles. In other words, let us be welcoming toward those who
are willing to take on family obligations, but serious in enforcing the
expectation that those obligations will in fact be fulfilled.
This, then, is where I would start in answering the questions of
who law should treat as family and what legal benefits should accom-
pany family membership. I would start with duties. Who takes on the
duties of family? Who should be encouraged, or forced, to fulfill those
duties?
You may well disagree with me on many points."' You may
think that "consent" is mythological. One does not consent to parent-
hood by engaging in sexual activities, you may say. Or one does not
accept a duty to donate an organ or other body part simply because
one is a parent. Surely one does not accept this duty as a sibling who
never chose to be born much less to be a sibling (I say this as a
middle child).' 19 You may think that preserving traditional narrow
defimitions of family would avoid any ambiguity about obligations. Or
you may think that people should be able to negotiate their own terms
of family relationships and not have obligations assigned simply be-
118. Some may prefer to abandon duty rhetoric and use the language of incentive
instead. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1465,
1466 (1989) ("My thesis is that the debate on equity between the generations focuses too
much on duty and too little on practice and incentive" especially regarding taxes and invest-
ment). Epstein also counts on "natural parental investment in their children." l at 1467.
This approach neglects the preconditions for such investment; it also does not speak to
issues of obligaiion rnning from children to their parents or across other family ties.
119. See Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 544 (1990) (footnote omitted) ("Families are unusual because, in
some instances, they create nonconsensual relationships"). Rutherford continues that families
are supposed to provide care nonetheless. I1 at 547. She also argues that relationships
created through voluntary agreement may imply duties beyond those expressly accepted. Id
(discussing the Uniform Partnership Act which treats partners as fiduciaries).
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cause of the fact of family membership (this is the "tailor-made" rath-
er than "off-the-rack" theory of family ties).
These potentially important points of disagreement actually dim in
significance when compared with the three difficulties in defining
family duties I will now explore. The first difficulty stems in part
from the fact that people disagree not only about family duties but
also about governmental duties. The two disagreements are linked and
therefore compounded.
In industrial societies since the nineteenth century, governmental
support is the likely alternative to privately performed family obliga-
tions;' 2° refusal to support a member of one's family may well trans-
late into requests for state subsidy. 12 1 Thus, disagreement about the
scope and enforceability of family obligations quickly collapses into
disagreement about the proper boundary between the family and the
government.
In the United States, one side in this debate views governmental
aid as a dangerous tinge of socialism that undermines private initiative;
another side criticizes the availability of governmental subsidies for the
ventures of the rich but not for the needs of the poor or middle
class. " Whatever view one takes, it becomes difficult to articulate
family obligations without engaging large and controverted political
questions about the role of the government, the rate of taxes, and
conceptions of public and private responsibility. Political debates over
the scope of a "social safety net" will affect significantly the articula-
tion of family duties even as articulation of family duties will affect
the scope of governmental programs. Working on one problem requires
120. Starting with the English Poor laws, see JOHN E. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE
POOR LAWS 1-19 (London, Henry Sweet 1869); state support in industrialized countries
increasingly replaced religious and community sources of support, see JOHN CUMMINGS,
POOR-LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW YORK 15-19 (New York, MacMillan 1895).
121. See FINCH, supra note 116, at 3, 7-12.
122. For a recent commentary on this debate, see Ellen Goodman, Family Rhetoric,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1992, at 83 ("French parents are not turned into irresponsible
louts because their government supports widespread and high quality child care. European
families are not shattered by paid maternity leave. Canadians do not consider a health care
system a private matter. And quality education is not left to the individual in Japan.").
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work on the other, as if they were simultaneous equations. But politics
is not as neat as math.
A second difficulty in articulating family obligations grows from
the particularly painful disagreements that arise when family members
no longer-if they ever did-love one another. Alimony payment after
divorce is a classic example."z Support for an elderly parent is an-
other. Unfortunately, so is child support, though often here it is the
lost love between the adults that undermines an obligation to children.
Noncompliance with legally-announced family duties can reflect
many things, and certainly one is resentment or disaffection toward the
recipient. Views about providing care or financial support for a relative
may be colored by how that person feels about the relative. And those
feelings, in turn, may be influenced in part by affection and personal
compatibility, and in part by a sense of debt due to the benefits the
person in need has offered the one in the past.
This issue of reciprocity points to the third difficulty: many family
duties are difficult to define because the simple measure of reciprocity
will not work. A parent cares for an infant, one hopes, out of love,
but if there is a sense of obligation, it more likely derives from the
parent's acknowledgment of responsibility for bringing the child into
the world, or for attending to someone with special vulnerabilities and
needs, than it does from an expected payback sometime in the future.
Some philosophers argue explicitly that an adult child does not owe
anything to an aging parent simply as a corollary of parental duty,
because there is no necessary reciprocation of acts the parent initially
performed due to the parent's own sense of duty.124 Nor do we owe
a return of favors done for us.12 But if a familial duty does not
123. Courts may be influenced by the specter of dependency on the state in evaluating
alimony or requests for modifying divorce settlements. See Brenda Cossman, A Matter of
Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality, 28 OSGOODE HALL L. 303 (1990)
(exploring the issue in Canadian cases).
124. NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS' KEEPER?: AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BE-
TWEEN THE YOUNG AND THE OLD 30 (1988); see also Jane English, What Do Grown Chil-
dren Owe Their Parents?, in VICE AND VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 682 (Christina Sommers
& Fred Sommers eds., 1989).
125. DANIELS, supra note 124, at 31.
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arise out of reciprocation, what is its source, and what should define
its scope?
I will examine each of these difficulties in greater detail while
searching for an appropriate pop song to accompany each one. It is
not that I have run out of television shows, or judicial opinions, but I
do believe that contemporary issues of family duty should become as
familiar as pop songs. Then, they may run through our minds and
enrich the rhythm of our lives. I will also consult a range of sources
that might help in articulating family duties, especially where an indi-
vidual potentially carries an obligation to more than one other family
member. Finally, I will return briefly to defend my initial proposal of
stringent attitudes toward family obligations to accompany expansive
defimitions of family membership. And I hope this provides a starting
point, not the end point, for discussing the contemporary issues of
family law.
II. BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRiVATE
OBLIGATIONS TO FAMILY MEMBERS
You will quickly see why I want something more catchy to use to
describe the first difficulty-"the contested boundaries between public
and private obligations to family members" just is not going to hit the
charts. Nor is "solving the simultaneous equations of family duties and
governmental responsibilities." Unfortunately, not many pop songs, or
popular discussions for that matter, address this issue directly. There
are some candidates if we put the issue more generally, however:
consider folk singer Nanci Griffith's song, "It's a Hard Life Wherever
You Go," 126  or blues artist Etta James' number, "Shakey
Ground."1 27 Or R.E.M.'s "Turn You Inside Out." 12 The basic idea
is that the risk of dependency is real for each of us, and deciding
whether anyone must help the dependents involves not just definitions
of family duties but also definitions of governmental programs.
126. NANCI GRIFFITH, It's a Hard Life Wherever You Go, on STORMS (MCA Records
1989).
127. ETTA JAMES, Shakey Ground, on SAVE YOUR ITCH (Island Records 1988).
128. LE.M., Turn You Inside Out, on LE.M. GREEN (Warner Bros. Records 1988).
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A. The Role of the Government
Roscoe Pound in 1916 alluded to this point when he noted that
"[ilt is important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic
relations from the social interest in the family and marriage as social
institutions."' 29 Lee Teitelbaum, Dean of the Utah Law School, put
the point this way: "[The family is a member of a set of social sys-
tems which, in shifting configurations and alignments, participates and
to some extent controls the distribution of opportunities, goods, and
benefits in our society." 130 Student loan programs put it more blunt-
ly: if the loan program can in any way characterize the student as a
family dependent, it will look to the resources of other family mem-
bers in calculating eligibility for and terms of the loan.13 '
Clearly, then, such ambiguity about the scope of family duties
allows governmental regulations to assume the existence and magnitude
of such duties even if the people involved do not or cannot accept
them, and the results of this assumption are often perverse or unfair. A
painful example arises for spouses who must themselves become poor
if their spouses are to qualify for Medicaid when they need care in an
institutional setting such as a nursing home.132 The states vary in
129. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV.
177 (1916).
130. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 801,
820-21 (1989).
131. Thus, the Stafford Loan, the Supplemental Loan for Students, and the Perkins
Loan become available only to students who are independent from their parents, a status
typically denied to students who are under 23 or claimed as tax deductions by their parents.
See GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL FINANCIAL AID SERVICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT
FOR STUDENTS APPLYING FOR FINANCIAL AID FOR ACADEMIC YEAR 1992-1993 1-2 (1992).
Some colleges and universities adopt eligibility guidelines for financial aid that consider
parents' income even for older students. Id. at 1. Current legislative debates address the
burdens on middle-class families posed by eligibility rules for financing higher education.
See Anthony Flint, Uncertainty Rises on 2 Education Fronts; Changes in US Aid Plan
Debated, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1991, at 1.
132. Paul Drizner, Comment, Medicaid's Unhealthy Side Effect: The Financial Burdens
on At-Home Spouses of Institutionalized Recipients, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1031 (1987).
Although family members provide eighty percent of all long-term care for partially disabled
elderly persons, DANIELS, supra note 124, at 25, the increased incidence or diagnosis of
Alzheimer's disease and other severe disabilities often calls for institutional care.
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their specific regulations under Medicaid, but they are permitted to
"deem" the resources of a non-institutionalized spouse as being
available for paying the medical expenses of an institutionalized
spouse'33 whether or not those resources are actually contributed.'34
For many people this creates a dilemma: the spouse who remains at
home can contribute the portion of income that the state determines he
should contribute-and then live on a severely reduced amount of
money, or he can refuse to contribute the money and potentially deny
hisspouse needed medical and nursing care. 135 While a few states,
more humanely, allow spouses to agree to divide their property, as
long as the federal government allows the practice of "deeming" with
no particular time restrictions, most people will be placed in very diffi-
cult situations.
Whether an individual feels a sense of responsibility to provide
financially for family members is complicated by the high costs of
institutional care and by the governmental determinations of the appro-
priate level of contribution. Yet the problem should not be viewed
solely in terms of the hardship individuals may feel. The demographic
shifts in the United States provide the larger social context: more and
more people live longer, and more and more medical expenditures are
devoted to caring for people in the last years of their lives. Large-scale
public policies, not only public and private articulations of family
duties, are at stake in the allocation of resources to the care of the
elderly. Whether the government assumes private duties is simply part
133. See The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. 11 1990); see also
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 435 U.S. 34 (1981) (permitting states to treat spouses as a
single economic unit for an indefinite timer period in establishing Medicaid terms). The
government also uses "deeming" in allowing states to attribute to the entire household child
support received by one child in a household even if this could estrange the parent paying
that child support or otherwise harm the recipient child. Bowen v. Guillard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987); see generally Lucy Billings, The Choice Between Living with Family Members and
Eligibility for Government Benefits Based on Need: A Constitutional Dilemma, 1986 UTAH
L. REv. 695.
134. See Drizner, supra note 132, at 1036; see also Timothy N. Carlucci, Note, The
Asset Transfer Dilemma: Disposal of Resources and Qualifications for Medicaid Assistance,
36 DRAKE L. REV. 369, 372-73 (1987) (state laws prohibit transfer of assets solely to quali-
fy for social security disability benefits, although an exception may be allowed for the
transfer of a home).
135. Drizner, supra note 132, at 1037.
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of a larger question about the allocation of social resources which is
inevitably a public policy question.136
The problem grows even more complex when the question of care
of the elderly involves not spouses, but adult children. Because fami-
lies across the United States tend to have fewer children than in the
past, "[f]or the first time in history, the average couple has more par-
ents living than it has children." 13 7 And because many more people
live long enough to become not only elderly, but frail, and because
they tend to have fewer adult children, the burden of caring for elderly
parents has changed. 138 Whatever intuitive ideas people may have
about a duty to care for their elderly parents, these demographic pat-
terns affect the shape of the need and people's abilities to cope with
that need. In addition, the presence or absence of coherent social poli-
cies and institutions alters the landscape within which adult children
define their own sense of duty to elderly parents. Thus, despite a legal
and cultural tradition distinguishing sharply between public and private
realms, public and private duties end up tied together and mutually
defining, as people actually struggle to address the needs of members
of their families.
Other demographic patterns affecting the relationship between
public and private duties include the high rates of divorce and remar-
riage. Adult children with elderly parents may divorce and remarry and
then develop changing notions of responsibility for those parents, or
for the parents of their spouses and ex-spouses.13 9 Perhaps more pro-
found is the changing role of women in the work force,1" since typ-
ically women provided the day-to-day care for dependents in the fami-
136. See Goodman, supra note 122, at 83 (arguing that private family matters cannot
be separated from governmental decisions about health care, child care, and other policies).
137. SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 154. Skolnick describes the situation of a great-great-
grandmother and her daughter, also a great-grandmother, and asks, who has the right to be
old and who should take care of the home? l at 164.
138. See DANIELS, supra note 124, at 24.
139. See id at 25.
140. FRANCES K. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WArrE, NEW FAMILIES, No FAMILIES?
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HoME 8-10 (1991) (documenting enormous
growth of women's workplace participation in the United States since the turn of the twen-
tieth century).
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ly. Many families may not be able to accept a solution which removes
a woman from the wage-market. Many women will not choose this
alternative; some may choose it if their employers make accommo-
dations for dependent-care leave or otherwise protect the woman's job
security. While these choices may be experienced as private dilemmas,
they are social phenomena shaped at least in part by the practices of
employers and governments. For women especially, the articulation of
family duties spills over into public policies about the workplace,
subsidized dependent care, respite care, and institutional options.
The status of women in the society in general also contributes to
difficulties in articulating spousal duties following divorce, especially
the terms of alimony. Professor Carl Schneider suggests that "[tihe
riddle of alimony is why one former spouse should support the other
when no-fault divorce seems to establish the principle that marriage
need not be for life and when governmental regulation is conventional-
ly condemned." 14
1
The riddle is not difficult to understand, nor perhaps to answer,
given the historical context of gender relations and divorce. Alimony
originally was the duty owed by the husband to the wife following the
breach of the marriage contract; it reflected the continuing duty to
provide support that the husband undertook with the marriage itself.
The reforms that brought no-fault divorce in turn expressed some of
the erosion of these gendered ideas of marriage, but also revealed
more profoundly that increasing numbers of people did not treat mar-
riage as an agreement for life.142 At the same time, women's contin-
uing disadvantages in the labor market consigned many women after
divorce to sharp declines in economic welfare. 143 Opportunities fore-
141. Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 197.
142. See MARTHA MINOW & DEBORAH L. RHODE, DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSS-
ROADS 191 (Steve Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1991).
143. See KATHEmRm S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF DOWN-
WARD MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 13, 202-28 (1988); LENORE 1.
WEn-zMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 204-07 (1985). Numerous methodological
criticisms of Weitzman's influential work focus largely on the failure to compare data about
women's experiences prior to changes in the rules governing divorce without challenging the
(Vol. 95:275
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gone during time spent at home attending to the marriage and
childraising may not be recaptured by most women.
Some are prompted to ask why an ex-husband should bear through
alimony payments the burdens of ongoing societal sex disorinina-
tion.144 Others, in contrast, call for continuing recognition after di-
vorce of spousal obligations undertaken at marriage.145 A third, very
long-run option would involve redressing sex discrimination in the
labor mhrket and thereby altering the need for alimony, but not en-
tirely; women who enter marriages with an understanding that they
will forgo careers and instead devote more of their time to managing
the home and caring for family members would still face economic
dependency if divorced. I do not mean to push a position on this
debate here; I have done so elsewhere. 4 6 I only mean to point out
that here, too, the articulation of private family duties necessarily im-
plicates larger social issues and public policies. 47
general picture of divorced women's economic disadvantages. See, e.g., Stanley E. Tobin,
The Divorce Revolution, 20 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1641 (1987) (book review); Jana B. Singer,
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989).
144. See Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-And Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 70-
71, 76-77.
145. See MINOW & RHODE, supra note 142, at 201-04.
146. See id,
147. It may seem rather obvious that the scope of family duties implicate the scope of
governmental ones. Certainly drafters of the Poor Laws understood this point. Nonetheless,
the historical weight of a distinction between the public and private spheres-the govern-
ment and the family-allows discussions of family matters to seem separate from public
policy. See Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 835 (1985). In addition, the historical exclusion of women from voting and other polit-
ical activities may have once made it seem that women's concerns remained separate from
public policies. Yet, women reformers like Jane Addams appealed to precisely the images of
women as mothers and teachers of moral values in an effort to alter public policy. See Jane
Addams, Why Women Should Vote, LADIES HOME J., Jan. 1910, at 230 ("If woman would
keep on with her old business of caring for her home and rearing her children she will
have to have some conscience in regard to public affairs lying outside of her immediate
household."). Even earlier female reformers connected women's private roles with public
policy. Angelina Grimke, for example, urged women of the South to recognize that even
though they lacked legislative power, they had duties as family members to oppose slavery:
"I know that you do not make the laws, but I also know that you are the wives and moth-
ers, the sisters and daughters of those who do; and if you really suppose you can do noth-
ing to overthrow slavery, you are greatly mistaken." Angelina Grimke, Appeal to the Chris-
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In sum, the first difficulty is that we cannot articulate family
duties in the absence of public policy discussions about work struc-
tures, gender roles, allocation of medical resources, and subsidies for
caring for the elderly. Yet the deep controversies about each of these
issues, and about the government's role in them, severely complicate
task.148
B. Lost Love
Finding a pop song for the second difficulty is no problem. Much
of the airwaves and record groves are filled with songs about love
lost; a modest sampling includes Whitney Houston's "Where Do Bro-
ken Hearts Go"; 149  Bonnie Raitt's "I Can't Make You Love
Me"; 150 Joan Baez's "Never Dreamed You'd Leave in Summer";15 1
and The Pretenders' "Thin Line Between Love and Hate".' 52 For a
specialized genre of these songs expressing anxious anticipation about
the end of love, Roberta Flack's "Will You Still Love Me Tomor-
row"153 provides a good example. The truth is, when love stops from
one direction, it may not stop from the other. The difficulty all these
songs suggest for family duties is whether obligations once formed by
love should endure when love ends.
Not surprisingly, philosophers as well as songsters have devoted
much time to this issue. Philosophers pose the question: are family
duties more like the duties of friendship or the duties of contractual
tian Women of the South, in THE PUBLIC YEARS OF SARAH AND ANGELINA GRIMKE: SE-
LECrED WRITINGS, 1835-1839 55 (Larry Ceplair ed., 1989).
148. Cf. DANIELS, supra note 124, at 35 (the problem is how to produce principles of
justice that yield a framework of institutions "within which people having different views
about what is good and right in other regards can cooperate").
149. WHITNEY HOUSTON, Where do Broken Hearts Go, on WHITNEY (Arista Records
1987).
150. BONNIE RArTr, I Can't Make You Love Me, on LUCK OF THE DRAw (Capitol
Records 1991).
151. JOAN BAEZ, Never Dreamed You'd Leave in Summer, on CLASSICS VOL. 8 (A&M
Records 1987).
152. THE PRETENDERS, Thin Line Between Love and Hate, on THE SINGLES (Sire Re-
cords 1987).
153. ROBERTA FLACK, Will You Still Love Me Tomorrow, on THE BEST OF ROBERTA
FLACK (Atlantic Records 1981).
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agreements?154 If friendship is the proper analogy, then love rather
than debt is the medium of exchange.155 This view implies that when
the love ends, so do the obligations. 56 Once again, issues about ali-
mony following divorce come to mind.
15 7
Here, I would challenge the analogy between family roles and
friendship, but I do so chiefly to expose the kind of difficulties loss of
love poses for articulating family duties. Jane English, who advanced
that analogy, maintains that "after a friendship ends, the duties of
friendship end. The party that has sacrificed less owes the other noth-
ing."158 Similarly, she argues, an adult child owes parents nothing.
She offered an example involving not organ donation, but blood dona-
tion:
For instance, suppose Elmer donated a pint of blood that his wife Doris
needed during an operation. Years after their divorce, Elmer is in an acci-
dent and needs one pint of blood. His new wife, Cora, is also of the same
154. See, e.g., English, supra note 124, at 683 (friendship rather than contract is the
model for ties between adult children and their parents). Some reject the analogy between
contractual relations and family ties for different reasons-and because they view contractual
relations not as too binding but instead too unstable. See Virginia Held, Non-contractual
Society: A Feminist View, in SCIENCE, MORALITY & FEMINIST THEORY (Marsha Hanen &
Kai Nielsen, eds.), CANADIAN J. PHIL., Supp. Vol. 13, 111 (1987) (urging image of family
ties of a less hostile, cold and precarious kind than contracts); see generally Hafen, supra
note 79, at 904-16 (relying on Pitirim Soroldn's comparison of familistic, contractual and
compulsory forms of personal relationships) (citing PITIRIM SOROKIN, SOCIETY, CULTURE, &
PERsONALTY: THEIR STRUCrURE AND DYNAMICS (2d. ed. 1962)). Perhaps neither contract
nor friendship provide convincing analogies for family ties because the first implies that
financial recompense can remedy a breach while the second implies no legal duties at all.
155. See English, supra note 124, at 683-85.
156. For reasons such as this one, Immanuel Kant articulated a theory of duty detached
from feeling, and indeed, segregated from feeling. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals, abridged and reprinted as The Foundation of Morals, in ETHICS
AND METAETHIcs: READINGS IN ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 346-47 (Raziel Abelson ed., 1963).
157. Yet the idea that marriage rests on love is relatively recent. See FRANCES GIES &
JOSEPH GIES, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 218-19 (1989); LAWRENCE
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987 51-58 (1990). When Carl Schneider asks
why one former spouse should have to support another once no-fault divorce establishes that
marriage need not be for life, see Schneider, supra note 141, at 197, he too implies that
once the love ends, the obligations end. Yet by posing his point as a riddle, he raises the
possibility that the end of a marriage itself does not and should not end the obligations
undertaken in it.
158. English, supra note 124, at 685.
1992-931
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blood type. It seems that Doris not only does not "owe" Elmer blood, but
that she should actually refrain from coming forward if Cora has volun-
teered to donate. To insist on donating not only interferes with the
newlyweds' friendship, but it belittles Doris and Elmer's former relation-
ship by suggesting that Elmer gave blood in hopes of favors returned in-
stead of simply out of love for Doris. It is one of the heart-rending fea-
tures of divorce that it attends to quantity in a relationship previously
characterized by mutuality. If Cora could not donate, Doris's obligation is
the same as that for any former spouse in need of blood; it is not in-
creased by the fact that Elmer similarly aided her. It is affected by the
degree to which they are still friends, which in turn may (or may not)
have been influenced by Elmer's donation. 9
I am not troubled by the rejection here of a quid pro quo analy-
sis; the world is simply not neat enough to present many issues of
obligation that take the form of "a pint of my blood for yours." Many
other things, however, trouble me about this example,'O but I will
focus here on only one. This presentation suggests that what one for-
mer spouse owes the other former partner depends on the current state
of their feelings for one another. Missing altogether is the potential
impact and power of the past-past friendship, past commitment, and
past trust.
The ficIde quality of present feeling is a problem not merely fol-
lowing divorce, but even in ongoing family relationships. If family
membership implies no further obligations beyond the degree of friend-
ship one member feels toward another, then I wonder what justifies
preserving the family institution, with its privileges and opportuni-
ties.161 Moreover, tying family duties to feelings of friendship tethers
159. Id at 685-86.
160. I am troubled by the initial effort to reframe the issue by introducing a potential
conflict with the new wife who conveniently has the same blood type and would feel inter-
fered with by an offer of help from the ex-wife. This seems both a dodge from the hard
question-should the ex-spouse feel obliged to donate blood when it is needed-as well as
an effort to accentuate competitive and interchangeable dimensions of family relationships. I
am even more troubled by the switch to a post-divorce example in an essay about ongoing
family ties between adult children and their parents; the implication is that adult children
and their parents are situated similarly to divorced spouses, perhaps because they too pre-
sumably no longer cohabit. The inattention to the differences between these relationships and
their shifts over time allows the author to avoid difficult and important questions about
what family duties should entail.
161. In a largely snide essay critical of philosophers, including feminists she deems as
318 [Vol. 95:275
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those duties to emotions that can and will change rather than assuring
stability and continuity. 62
Tying family duties to feelings most significantly precludes the
chance that feelings can themselves be educated as someone learns
about and carries out responsibilities. 63 Professor Bruce Hafen has
suggested that "[a] genuine personal willingness to assume affirmative
duties and lasting commitments depends heavily upon the influence of
normative models that have the innate power to produce altruistic
attitudes regardless of legal enforceability."'1" As this point implies,
difficulties in defining family duties arise not merely because people
disagree about whether those duties should exist apart from feelings,
but also because the specified content of family duties will itself influ-
ence and shape what people come to feel.1 65
hostile to family, Christina Sommers makes one point with which I do agree:
[lJf what one owes to members of one's family is largely to be understood in
terms of feelings of personal commitment, definite limits are placed on what one
owes. For as feelings change, so may one's commitments. The result is a structure
of responsibility within the family that is permanently unstable.
Christina Sommers, Philosophers Against the Family, in VICE AND VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY
LIFE supra note 124, at 728, 751.
162. These values may be most important for parent-child relationships, but I am not
convinced of their irrelevance to adult relationships.
163. See generally ROBERT SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS (1979) (cognitive theory of the
emotions).
The familistic entity draws upon different philosophical wellsprings from those that
feed contractual models. By its nature, the familistic entity has greater capacity to
encourage the kind of human caring and sense of mutual responsibility for which
the contemporary world cries out-even though such sensitivities cannot always be
legally required or enforced.
Hafen, supra note 79, at 914; see also i at 916 (exploring the paradox of loving bondage
through ties that bond to a spirit of intimate belonging).
164. Id at 914.
165. See ALFIE KOHN, THE BRIGHTER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE: ALTRUISM & EMPA-
THY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 118-204 (1990) (social science research indicates that predispositions
to share and to be selfish can be reinforced or truncated by external encouragement).
Different conceptual and enforcement problems are posed by rules holding parents
liable for child's curfew violation, John Hood, Making Parents Pay: Atlanta Law Sets Off a
Curfew Craze of Questionable Value, CH. TRIB., Apr. 25, 1991, at 17, or holding family
members responsible for criminal drug or violent activity occurring by residents of publicly
subsidized housing, see Section 8 Housing Assistance Program, 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.215(c)(2),
882.216(c)(1), 882.514(g)(1) (1992) and Housing Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. §§
887.213(b)(1), 887.403(d)(1) (1992). These pose the question of vicarious liability designed
1992-931 319
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Duties and feelings interact in complicated ways. Many people
know they have a family duty-even a legally enforceable one-and
resent it rather than grow to accept it. Certainly the dismal rates of
child support payments demonstrate this problem.1" Professor David
Chambers' classic study of child support enforcement suggests the
complex motives and feelings of those who do not pay.1 67 Especially
sad is the apparent spillover onto the children of negative feelings
towards the ex-spouse. 161
This spillover renders especially difficult the task of articulating
parental duties for an individual who seeks to modify child support
obligations after fathering additional children in a new marriage or
relationship.1 69  As one observer of these kinds of families noted:
"There is anger when money needed by the new family goes to one
spouse's children from the old family. There is hurt at the recurring
perhaps with the hope that families can restrain their members from violating laws, a hope
that faces serious empirical contest and thus supports unduly punitive rules. I have examined
this issue in more detail in Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REV. 925.
166. Jason DeParle, Child Poverty Twice as Likely After Family Split, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, at 8: "Only 44 percent of absent fathers were paying child support
four months after the breakup, a figure that changed little a year later. Although mothers
worked more after a breakup, their efforts did not compensate for the fathers' absence, and
family income declined by 37 percent." Some estimates paint an even bleaker picture: "[']n
1983, nearly two-thirds of residential parents reported to the Census Bureau that they re-
ceived no child support from non-residential parents." Karen Czpanskiy, Child Support and
Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 638 (1989).
In response to such evidence, Prof. David Ellwood noted: "The greatest source of
insecurity in America is growing up in a single-parent home . . . . We've done very little
to see that absent fathers do their share." DeParle, supra, at 8 (quoting Prof. Ellwood). The
problem encompasses both post-divorce and unmarried parenting situations.
167. DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUP-
PORT 241-53 (1979).
168. Id. at 242-50. Sommers alluded to this difficulty when she concluded, "I do not
know how to make fathers ashamed of their neglect and inadvertent cruelty. What I do
know is that moral philosophers should be paying far more attention to the social conse-
quences of their views than they are." Sommers, supra note 161, at 752. Czpanskiy explic-
itly addressed the difficulty of designing legal rules with incentives for both custodial and
noncustodial parents to focus on the children's entire range of financial and emotional
needs, and her exploration indicates the grave difficulties in this task. See Czpanskiy, supra
note 166, at 619.
169. See Minow & Rhode, supra note 142, at 207.
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evidence of a past history shared with the first family and forever
closed from the new spouse." 170 Clearly, making family duties con-
tingent on feelings is especially fraught with trouble in this con-
text.17' But articulating sensible duties without taking account of
shifting feelings may also be terribly mistaken simply as a practical
matter.
Perhaps the problem arises with tying family duties to sentiments
altogether. It is possible to articulate family duties that survive the flux
of feelings; it is possible to frame family responsibilities through
which one's own good depends on the welfare of another. Norms
predicated on such a view could actually affect what people come to
feel and such norms could include a continuation of duty beyond the
sentiment that the past should matter when it comes to family obliga-
tions. 172 But pursuing these ideas is hardly uncontroversial. Lost love
animates so many songs because it is painful, and articulating family
duties in the light of past or future painful feelings will be a troubled
task indeed.
C. Inadequacy of Reciprocation Theory
On the flip side of love that ends is love that is not returned.
Consider Joan Armatrading's "Can't Let Go"; 173 or Tina Turner's
170. ALEX SHOUMATOFF, THE MOUNTAIN OF NAMEs 169 (1985) (quoting LErrY C.
POGREBIN, FAMILY POLmcs: LOVE AND POWER ON AN INTIMATE FRONTIER (1983)).
Pogrebin identities further complications: "A father feels guilty about spending every day
with his stepchildren while his own kids, in the custody of their mother, hunger for more
time with him." Id
171. Rules and duties watered down to mirror self-indulgence may not reflect people's
deeper desires to be bound. See Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family
Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34.
172. One version of this view appears in Dwight J. Penas, Bless the Tie That Binds: A
Puritan-Covenant Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 8 LL. & INEQUALITY 533, 541 (1990) (ad-
vocating same-sex marriage in light of Puritan theological consent of covenant through
which each party commits to remain bound by the agreement even in the event of the
other's breach). A less stringent version would look to the past as a basis for continuing
obligations even if the earlier conditions of love and mutuality were absent. This view
animates the responses of many Americans. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 86 (1985).
173. JOAN ARMATRADING, Can't Let Go, on HEARTS AND FLOWERS (A&M Records
1992-93]
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"You Can't Stop Me Loving You"; 174 or even the Indigo Girls'
"You And Me of the 10,000 Wars." 175 It is funny that we do not
hear many songs about "Thanks for All You Did But I Don't Owe
You Anything."
176
Even more scarce, though, are song titles that capture the third
difficulty in defining family obligation-that the notion of reciprocation
is inadequate to capture the complexity of family bonds, and therefore
the measure of family duties becomes difficult to define. For example,
unlike an exchange of promises between two people, and even unlike a
marriage in which two adults agree to provide and care for one anoth-
er, relationships between parents and children are not obviously
reciprocal. 1 7  Of course, parents derive benefits from their children,
but they differ from those the children derive from their parents.1 71
Parents may hope that the children, once grown, will provide compara-
ble financial, emotional, and physical support in return, and indeed,
many societies implement such assumptions.179
1990).
174. TINA TURNER, You Can't Stop Me Loving You, on FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Capitol
Records 1989).
175. INDIGO GIRLS, You and Me of the 10,000 Wars,- on NOMADS, INDIANs, SAINTs
(Epic Records 1990).
176. One possible candidate: TOM BALL & KENNY SULTAN, How Can I Miss You
When You Won't Go Away, on Too MUCH FUN (Flying Fish Records 1990). Yet this song
is undoubtedly a tongue-in-check effort, poking fun at the "my man is gone" genre of
country and western songs.
177. I do not mean to argue as did Jane English that family members should never be
motivated by a sense of reciprocity because that would somehow degrade or sully the rela-
tionship, see English, supra note 124, at 685, but instead that such motives make for diffi-
culties in defining and enforcing family duties.
178. Especially unappealing are efforts to convert the benefits a parent receives from
the experience of parenting into a theory of unjust enrichment justifying reciprocal duties by
the child, although others have pursued efforts along these lines. See Noam J. Zohar, Pro-
creation and Personal Autonomy: Identity and Individuation in the Parental Relation (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University). A better justification for parental duties
toward children looks to the child's dependence on the parent and from compliance with
social practices that assign children's care to their parents. See John Eekelaar, Are Parents
Morally Obliged to Care for Their Children?, 11 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 340 (1991).
179. Individuals may craft conditions on gifts of property in order to ensure that their
adult children provide them with care and support. See, e.g., Boucher v. Bufford, 494
S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971) (bequest of property to son conditioned on his providing
for parents during their lives); Hatfield v. Hatfield, 417 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1967) (conveyance
[Vol. 95:275
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Yet reciprocation implies a more exact one-for-one exchange than
the dynamics that most parent-child relations exemplify. Of course,
parents derive pleasure and gratification from children as they grow
up, but not as quid pro quo for what the parents themselves provide
the children. Moreover, intergenerational exchanges between adult
children and their parents may be complicated by the death, disability,
or mobility of one or both parties before completion.
Even this understates the complications, because often more than
two parties are involved. Since families often involve more than one
generation and more than two people, the notion of reciprocation that
so often defines the scope of duties seems out of place. The adult
child may have two parents, plus stepparents, who need help as older
adults; the adult child may have siblings and step siblings with whom
to negotiate about who will provide support for the older relatives. The
adult child in turn may have children and feel conflicting pulls of
duties in two generational directions. One woman interviewed about
these matters reported:
Someone said I should have given up my job and looked after my moth-
er .... I said, well I have three young children and if I give up work
my children would miss a lot .... [I had to] choose between one kind of
duty and another kind of duty. That was very difficult, I had to choose. to
let her go [into a home.] 8'
Moreover, some may actually understand their duty to their aging
parents in terms of providing for their own children the way their
parents provided for them.
What, though, are the duties of a parent who has more than one
child, and one has a disability that calls for more time and attention
than the other child? Given all the possible complications, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to articulate family duties removed from the
of farm to daughter-in-law condition on her caring for mother-in-law). Yet the courts may
well read those obligations narrowly. See, e.g., Quarnstrom v. Murphy, 281 N.W.2d 847
(Minn. 1979) (son's obligation to support mother according to father's will construed to be
triggered only if she is unable to meet her own financial obligations).
180. FINCH, supra note 116, at 151 (quoted in JANE E. LEWIS & BARBARA MEREDIH,
DAUGHTERS WHO CARE 78 (1988)) (quoting an interviewee).
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particularities of each complicated constellation of family membership;
the notion of reciprocity does not help, at least if it implies simply tit-
for-tat.181
As an alternative to simple reciprocation, some people and some
families operate complex networks of exchange. African-American
families often build patterns of sharing and exchange of favors across
networks of siblings, aunts, and uncles, and other family members,
especially when it comes to caring for children. 82 Today, middle-
class blacks often find their economic security jeopardized because
they reach out to help more impoverished relatives. 183 One fourteen-
year-old mother explained:
Ever since I can remember I always expected to have a baby when I was
15 or 16 but I never believed I would ever have a chance to get a hus-
band. One of the things my grandmother always said, "Pay your dues to
your kin because they will take care of you.""'
"Kin" here could include a variety of people, working cooperatively to
meet the basic demands of cooking, cleaning, childcare, and making
ends meet.
Other observers worry that complicated family patterns may pro-
duce "thinner bonds" even while creating wider kinship patterns. In
particular, Frank Furstenberg and Andrew Cherlin recently raised this
question about remarriage:
Remarriage certainly expands the potential universe of kin, but does it also
dilute the importance of each link? The potential value of weak ties to a
large network of relatives shouldn't be underestimated. Access to informa-
tion, to sponsorship, and to minor assistance through remarriage chains can
have a significant impact on a child's life chances. But this thinner form
of kinship may not be an adequate substitute for the loss of relatives who
had a stronger stake in the child's success. Through divorce and remar-
181. Actually, a deeper problem of conflicting duties arises even between two people,
because each may experience conflict between duty to oneself and duty to the other.
182. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COM-
MUNrrY (1974).
183. Isabel Wilkerson, Middle Class Blacks Try to Grip a Ladder While Lending a
Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 26, 1990, at Al.
184. SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 217.
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riage, individuals are related to more and more people, to each of whom
they owe less and less .... Families not only nurture and protect chil-
dren, they also distribute resources; and in so doing they create lasting
obligations .... Remarriage has complicated this system of exchange
because it offers no clear-cut guidelines for assignment rights and obliga-
tions.
185
I wonder what clear-cut guidelines these authors believe existed
previously or exist currently for families without remarriage patterns.
The problem of defining duties within families seems complicated for
everyone who has more than one other person who counts as family.
Simple notions of reciprocation will not work.
Hm. REVISrNG DUTIES
Let us revisit the definition of duty in the context of the bone
marrow transplant sought by Tamas Bosze. Remember, he wanted to
save one son and therefore asked a court to order tests on two other
children he fathered with a woman other than his wife.186 The moth-
er of the two children declined the tests because she believed her duty
was to ensure that the children suffered no harm. If she had been the
mother of the child needing the bone marrow transplant, should her
assessment have differed?1 17 Should a parent consider exposing one
child to harm in order to help another child?
What notion of duty could help here? Prevailing normative frame-
works of analysis could help, despite the difficulties I have explored.
Perhaps a parent should try to ensure the greatest good for the greatest
number within the family.188 If so, the parent could weigh the risk to
185. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 44, at 86, 95. These authors seem to have
white, middle class families in mind-not the kinds of families described by Carol Stack,
for example.
I wonder whether Furstenberg & Cherlin have a different economic class in mind
than does Carol Stack, if so, it would be somewhat ironic that strong bonds of sharing
could exist among people who have little resources while people with more resources find
extended networks of family a reason to reduce commitments to share.
186. See discussion supra Part Two, section I. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his
request. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
187. It is difficult to figure what role love past or lost may have played between the
Tamas Bosze and the mother of these children.
188. This is a roughly utilitarian approach, although 1) it is not clear that most utilitar-
1992-931
51
Minow: All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owin
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the donor child with the gain to the recipient child in order to fulfill
the duty to the family as a whole. Yet even this formulation is inade-
quate to the multiple interests involved if it neglects long-run conse-
quences. For example, this approach might seem quite wanting if it
implied that the greatest good for the family could be achieved by
selling one child's organs-or one child altogether-in order to im-
prove the financial security of the remaining family members."8 9
Condemning such a result depends upon a norm that differs from
the greatest good for the greatest number. Instead, at work is a norm
of respect for each individual person that demands that no one is to be
used simply as a means.190 Accordingly, sacrificing one child alto-
gether for the good of others would seem a violation. Yet short of
complete sacrifice, this norm could still permit a parent to fulfill duties
to more than one child by authorizing bone marrow transplant from
one to another. The parent could conclude that the donor child would
be devastated by the loss of the sibling or would later regret a failure
to help save that sibling. Under this view, it is the duty between sib-
lings that is salient; the parent's duty derives from the donor sibling's
duty. By authorizing the bone marrow transplant, the parent may fulfill
a duty to protect the donor's interests, not only a duty to the recipient
child.
Articulating a parent's duties in this fashion is bound to be tenta-
tive and abstract. Besides revealing deeply conflicting normative frame-
works for defining such duties, this discussion reveals once again the
special problems posed by multiple relationships among family mem-
bers. Again, reciprocity does not seem a useful concept to provide the
measure of duty; at best, it could play a role as part of a process of
ians would apply the calculus of utilities to matters involving children, 2) nor is it clear
that they would circumscribe within one family the group whose interests are to be consid-
ered. Nonetheless, the calculus of goods and harms across several people is a common
method of normative analysis used in both philosophy and everyday decisionmaking.
189. This is a current problem posed when some families surrender a child for adop-
tion, especially families in developing countries responding to the demand for children in
wealthier nations. See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Overview, in ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTIcE, §§ 10.01-06 (Supp. 1991).
190. Thanks to Kant for this formulation.
[Vol. 95:275326
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hypothesizing what one would be willing to do for another if called
upon to do so.
A different problem of reciprocity joins this discussion with my
concerns from Part One of this Article: perhaps obligations within
families should be defined as correlates of the very definitions of fami-
lies and of benefits accorded on the basis of family membership. Here
the reciprocity would run between the family and the state rather than
between family members. In exchange for the privileges of family
status, each family would carry the same package of obligations. For
example, if the state accorded lawful marital status to a gay or lesbian
couple that so desired it, the argument would run, that couple should
.have the same obligations as would any other married couple with
respect to that benefit. If that couple is entitled to benefits such as
eligibility for inheriting a rent-controlled apartment191 or spousal em-
ployee benefits,192 then that couple should be subject to the same in-
come deeming rules applied to other married couples. 193 Yet even
this notion of reciprocity leaves the articulation of family duties unde-
fined. Not only are the family duties applicable to "each family" still
ambiguous, but the application of any articulated set of duties across
the vast array of family types would yield enough problems to fill
Family Law exams from here to eternity.
One response to the confusion about family duties is to use pri-
vate ordering techniques such as antenuptial contracts, separation agree-
ments, parent-child contracts, and domestic partnership agreements. Yet
these private agreements, like all contracts, do not resolve or avoid
publicly articulated duties. 94 The question still remains, then, what
duties should provide the background assumptions for such private
agreements, and what duties should not be subject to private contractu-
al alteration?
Modification of child support once again provides an example.
The noncustodial parent may seek to modify child support payments
191. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
192. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing Medicaid rules).
194. Since most such contracts never receive the public review of adjudication, it is
difficult to estimate how much they may supplant public obligations.
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despite a prior agreement or court order. As I have already mentioned,
a typical reason for such a request is the appearance of children in a
subsequent marriage or relationship. This problem implicates each of
the difficulties already discussed. The state's AFDC payments or other
income supports may be implicated if the custodial parent is finan-
cially eligible; statutory guidelines for child support would govern in
every case and these reflect assumptions about the requisite private
investment to keep children off of public dependency programs. The
custodial parent might also be inclined to accept a negotiated agree-
ment to reduced child support payments in order to avoid unpleasant-
ness or to avoid nonpayment altogether, especially if the noncustodial
parent bears resentment for the loss of love.
The competing obligations owed to the older children and the
younger children renders the entire question even more difficult. 95
The support-owing parent may be willing to take on a second job or
work overtime in order to meet those competing obligations, but may
also decline such extra work if all or some of the added income is
directed toward the children not in his household. Perhaps the duties
should be evaluated on the imagined assumption that all the children
are part of the same family. Hypothesizing that all the children lived
in the same household-and the same two parents jointly produced the
children and cared for them together-there is an argument for allow-
ing reduced payments per child. The argument would look to econo-
mies of scale and also toward fairness within that group of children as
a whole. But precisely that assumption of "one family" is absent here,
where the noncustodial parent has produced children in a second
195. A critical factor would involve the actual level of the initial child support: is it
set at a minimum point or at a generous level; does it call for upward adjustments in light
of the cost of living and increased expenses as children grow older? See generally U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS 1-4 (1987), reprinted in JUDITH
AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 183-94 (2d ed. 1991) (directing states to
develop guidelines that ensure equal rights for each child to share in that parent's income
"subject to factors such as the age of the child, income of each parent, income of current
spouses, and the presence of other dependents").
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household.196 Implicating all the difficulties in articulating family du-
ties, this problem I hope will stir discussion among us.
This discussion suggests what should now be the predictable three
difficulties in articulating family duties: they presuppose and yet also
affect governmental duties; they reflect lost love and emotional flux;
they lack a clear measure of reciprocity and bear the complications of
relationships among many people. Prevailing value discussions that
compare utilities or call for respecting persons have paid little attention
to issues within families197 and prompt divergent suggestions when
applied to families.
Yet I hope this discussion illuminates more than these difficulties.
In particular, I think attention to the connections between matters too
often separated enriches the analysis of family duties. Thus, recogniz-
ing the interdependence of family duties and state treatment of families
can clarify how some apparent dilemmas could be resolved with a
shift in governmental policies.
The government will not and cannot be neutral about family du-
ties. Some duties will be enforced and others will not be. But the
background governmental rules do have an important impact on the
family duties that people accept and those they find too burdensome.
Having a reliable safety net would help; having a coherent universal
health policy would help. Here, I am reminded of a discussion with a
Canadian friend whose father had suffered a heart attack. We discussed
questions about how this would affect the family and who would care
for him if he became disabled. Then she remarked that however diffi-
cult these matters were, she could not imagine the burdens people in
comparable situations in the United States would feel if they simul-
taneously had to worry about the costs of the medical care.
Another useful insight about connections: predicating family duties
on feelings may be hazardous, but so is disregarding the possibility
that well-articulated family duties could influence positively the feel-
196. Should the presence of a stepparent in first household affect noncustodial parent's
child support obligations? This poses another difficult set of concerns worthy of serious
attention.
197. See SUSAN OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
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ings people develop. This notion includes attending to the value of
enduring commitments. Commitments can last even beyond the feel-
ings, especially if we encourage them to last. Granted, reciprocation
may fail as a measure of duty where families involve many people
across generations. That very failure suggests alternative conceptions of
duty that can operate within complex networks of care and ex-
change.198 Finally, conceptions of family duties must also be consid-
ered in relation to shifting notions of who is in the family and what
benefits and duties should attach to family membership.
These insights would not solve, but would enrich, consideration of
many controversies. These include contests over religious exposure
during visits by noncustodial parents discussed in Part One.' The
courts tend to treat many cases as clashes between parental preroga-
tives and children's best interests. For example, courts tend to translate
debates over religious exposure during visits with noncustodial parents
as a question about the child's best interests. I think it is helpful to
start by acknowledging that the government cannot remain neutral. The
notion of the child's best interests, if secular, could depart from a
religious view, and a decision to permit exposure to more than one
religion is no more neutral than a decision to restrict exposure to only
one religion, since both affect deeply the child's religious understand-
ings and identity.
I suggest that we shift to the task of articulating more fully the
parents' duties in this context, including duties to attend to the impact
of their prerogatives on the child. Perhaps a different notion of simple
reciprocity between the parents is present here, a basic'respect for one
another's religious views. Yet, once again, that notion is inadequate for
this task. Clarifying who is the family for the purpose of respecting
family privacy should involve attention to the privileges and duties the
parents plan to exercise.
Let me offer one last case. Again, I do not claim to resolve it but
instead offer considerations that could deepen our legal and moral un-
198. It might be worth considering different kinds of rationales and duties accompany-
ing different relationships, although that approach would risk dimming the moral content of
"duty" and then obscuring the scope of duties when not expressly negotiated.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
[Vol. 95:275
56
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/5
ALL IN THE FAMILY
derstandings of it. A car driven by a drunk driver struck a school-
teacher named Sharon Kowalski and left her brain-damaged and other-
wise considerably disabled.2' Karen Thompson at that time informed
Sharon's parents that the two woman had been living together in a
close and loving lesbian relationship; they had exchanged rings and
were buying a house together." 1 Karen sought authority to serve as
Sharon's guardian. The Kowalskis refused, sought and obtained guard-
ianship, barred Karen from visiting Sharon, and tried to sever the
connection between the two women. Recently, the parents, due to their
own physical frailty, sought to have another person appointed guardian.
The court initially approved this appointment of a third party, but then,
finally, accepted Karen Thompson's request for guardianship. The case
elicited public attention and involved long and complicated legal pro-
ceedings in local, state, and federal courts.
No doubt the Kowalskis believed they acted with concern for their
daughter's best interests. At the same time, the case demonstrates the
difficulties for people in nontraditional relationships lacking state rec-
ognition; without an official marriage or even a durable power of
attorney, the law treated Karen Thompson as a stranger for much of
the proceedings. 20 2 This case implicates the contemporary, unresolved
questions about who is in the family and who should be eligible for
the benefits of family membership.
But receiving less discussion are the equally, significant questions
of family duty here. I began by asserting that family duties should be
strict even as I assert that the definition of family should be generous.
Karen Thompson clearly accepted the duties accompanying what she
treated as a marriage; she pursued the kind of care she believed would
be in Sharon's best interests. Sharon's parents also tried to perform a
duty to their daughter.
200. See generally KAREN THOMPSON, WHY CAN'T SHARON KowALsI COME HOME?
(1988); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and
Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMPLE L. REv. 511, 514-21 (1990).
201. See THOMPSON, supra note 200, at 15; In re Guardianship of Kowalsld, 382
N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986).
202. See Robson & Valentine, supra note 200, at 515.
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Assuming that Sharon's parents owed a duty to care for their
daughter-or wished to fulfill such a duty-how should that duty be
described? That duty of parents of an adult child, I suggest, should
include an obligation to recognize and try to respect the child's life
choices, especially choices in defining her own family. A judicial
appreciation of this element of parental duty could complicate some
cases, but would help join the issues of loving and owing with the
issues of family diversity that are bound to perplex us for some time
to come.
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